Short and silly question, but it opens-up to a separation of idealism and materialism on the basis of information.
If computations (in the scenario of a materialistic-computational perspective of the world) occur in matter, then said computation looks like some interaction (of what precisely, some generalized concept of discrete units ?); but said interaction executes then outside of these units, since it would be otherwise a negation of this "discretization": the units would need some universal medium to interact.
It then seems that the argument from a computational world needs to borrow from the mental perspective at least the idea of some medium of interaction (which can be exemplified by a force, a field, etc.), and that requires either a renewed redefinition of "matter" or the integration of some mild acceptance of idealism. I am maybe missing something as to how a computational-physicalist would build a representation to truly avoid any hint of idealism (as the general concept of things happening in some mind, be it a very natural and universal mind).
In the end, isn't the notion of "information" just a trick to avoid the use of the world Mind (by using an intermediate word which seems more physicalist) ?
