Problem with Refutation of Idealism

Question

Can someone please defend Kant's refutation of idealism in the B-edition, because it seems untenable to me.

First, he claims that 'I' am aware of myself being subjected to a specific temporal order of cognitions. He then claims, for this to happen I need a reference point and since this reference point cannot be 'Time' (since Time is transcendental) it has to be things-in-themselves. And thus, things-in-themselves must exist (idealism is refuted here).

However, things-in-themselves are also transcendental, so this argument is untenable to me. If I cannot even intuit things-in-themselves, how can I use them as a reference point? Secondly, isn't it the function of the pure intuition of time (inner-sense) itself to order the objects in a specific order? I cannot even have appearances without it having a specific order in TIME (time is itself that order). I thought this was clear in the Aesthetic, and since time is pure intuition (a priori), it cannot refute idealism.

A second, and more charitable reading I came across is that the point of reference is actually the objects of outer-sense, i.e, space. But in this case, it doesn't even refute idealism at all (maybe Descartes but not all Berkeley's). Berkeley can definitely agree with this logic because space also is a priori (a mere idea which cannot establish existence of material independent of me).

Answer 1

I see you are reading the CPR and asking questions while you read it which is a great exercise in Philosphy. May I suggest Bird's commentary to accompany your reading? (The revolutionary Kant) To try and answer your question: Kant's argument in RoI is not dealing with noumena. The existence of external objects is the existence of a distinction between outer-sense objects. It does refute idealism insofar as it refutes any thesis that sees all that appears as produced by the subject. I am no expert in Berkeley but I will add this: an idealist system in which all that appears is manifestation of the subject is refuted by Kant's RoI. An idealist system in which all that appears is manifestation of another superior subject isn't refuted by Kant's RoI but by the limitation of the field in which knowledge is legitimate. In this case Kant would say that there are no grounds to make such an assertion (see Critique of judgment- theleological judgment-§§73-77)

Answer 2

Transcendental realism posits space and time as being properties of things in themselves which we access through our senses, and since our senses sometimes fail us, we can be skeptical about their objects, indeed, up to the point of being skeptical whether such objects exist at all.

Berkeley, as Kant understands him (and Kant may have misunderstood him) was a radical skeptic who believed that "outer experience" was an illusion. There is no "outer," only an "inner." Kant does however believe in the objective reality of outer experience. Sure, experience sometimes tricks us, e.g., the bent stick in the water, but we have a faculty of understanding that helps us distinguish between appearances that constitute objective reality according to rules of understanding.

If only that were the end of the argument. The argument in the Critique's "Refutation of Idealism" is based on something persisting amidst the changing mental states we experience. Any experience of anything involves an experience of persistence and alteration (Kant's dynamic categories) so that gives us the persistent thing of substance in experience. Kant says that time, and by extension, cause, can only be experienced in combination with persistence. Were we unaware of persistence, we would also be unaware of any alteration.

And if only Kant had stopped there, but no. Not only do we experience change and permanence at the same time, the former, in the case of mental states, is experienced INSIDE us while the latter is perceived OUTSIDE us. Is it because it would be a contradiction to experience BOTH inside us? Can I become aware of a permanent and changing headache at the same time? Obviously, the transient state that I experience inside me can only occur against the backdrop of a non transient state outside me.

In fact, when I experience something "inside," don't I also experience an "outside" at the same time? How can I experience a headache if I don't at the same time experience something other than a headache? Experience always consists of a background and a foreground. Time is always moving, space is always standing still.