Can someone please defend Kant's refutation of idealism in the B-edition, because it seems untenable to me.
First, he claims that 'I' am aware of myself being subjected to a specific temporal order of cognitions. He then claims, for this to happen I need a reference point and since this reference point cannot be 'Time' (since Time is transcendental) it has to be things-in-themselves. And thus, things-in-themselves must exist (idealism is refuted here).
However, things-in-themselves are also transcendental, so this argument is untenable to me. If I cannot even intuit things-in-themselves, how can I use them as a reference point? Secondly, isn't it the function of the pure intuition of time (inner-sense) itself to order the objects in a specific order? I cannot even have appearances without it having a specific order in TIME (time is itself that order). I thought this was clear in the Aesthetic, and since time is pure intuition (a priori), it cannot refute idealism.
A second, and more charitable reading I came across is that the point of reference is actually the objects of outer-sense, i.e, space. But in this case, it doesn't even refute idealism at all (maybe Descartes but not all Berkeley's). Berkeley can definitely agree with this logic because space also is a priori (a mere idea which cannot establish existence of material independent of me).