The traditional notion of logic, broadly speaking) is that it is a system of laws and principles governing valid inferential reasoning (i.e. laws of logic logical principles). But what precisely distinguishes the one concept/category from the other; and is the distinction roughly the same in Aristotelian logic as opposed to modern propositional logic? In other words, in the domain of logic by what criteria does one characterize a principle as a 'principle' and a law as a 'law'?
Is it that a principle is more general or flexible than a law (or vice versa)? That principles are optional whereas laws are necessary? Is a law is simply stricter in both semantic definition and formalized description? Is a law necessarily reducible to mathematical equations/formulation, whereas a principle not [necessarily]? And do these distinctions hold in domains of [harder?] empirical sciences, such as physics or dynamics (eg. laws of physics vs physical principles)?
(Aside: The impetus of this question was an older post I ran into querying the difference between the law of the excluded middle (LEM) and the principle of bivalence (POB), which turned out to be more contentious and controversial than I expected. What is the difference between Law of Excluded Middle and Principle of Bivalence?)