I am wondering how much of a nonstarter you think this argument is. I am also interested in suggestions concerning articles or books to read. (More recent works preferred, as I can follow their citations back in time as necessary.) You can speak very freely--though I do have a PhD in philosophy, it's been nearly a decade since I did any serious reading or tried to write for publication. So I'm currently back at the level of an eager grad student with some good instincts but no awareness of the lit.
- If tautologies are true, this is either due to how the world is or how linguistic conventions are.
2 If X is due to how Y is, then there is some way Y could be that would negate X.
Tautologies are not true due to how the world is because there is no way the world could be that could make a tautology false.
They also are not true due to how linguistic conventions are because there is no way linguistic conventions could be that could make a tautology false. (Changing the meaning of logical terms in the tautology would not make the tautology itself false, it would just make it no longer possible to express that tautology using those terms in that order.)
So, tautologies are not true.
Obviously that seems like an incredible conclusion (literally) so to head off responses like "it's a non-starter because of its conclusion" I want to clarify, if the argument works I'd further argue that tautologies do have a truth-like property, they're truish, truthy, true-in-a-model, fictionally true, something along those lines. It's just that this truthlike property is not identical to the similar truth property held by empirical statements like "Kris weighs more than Julian."
BTW the most immediate cause of my conjuring up this weird argument is I am in the middle of reading Linguistic Conventionalism by Brett Topey (Phil Studies, 2018). I mention this in case it may give some context.