It has now been a decade since the publication of Daniel Wegner's The Illusion of Conscious Will. I read it when it was released but have not followed subsequent debate and developments. I would be interested to learn of substantive appraisals of the philosophical import of its arguments. Perhaps there is only tangential effect on the philosophy of mind? For, if I recall correctly, although he argued that conscious will was an illusion, he certainly allowed that unconscious processes/thoughts could be "implementing" free will, so-to-speak, and that conscious processes affect later unconscious processes. So his experiments and arguments do not entirely undermine free will.
Eddie Nahmias commented in 2002: "When consciousness matters" philosophical Psychology vol 15(4) p527-554: "When all is said and done, Wegner has offered no evidence or arguments against this proposal: certain brain processes have the property of being consciously represented to the agent as mental states we describe as beliefs, desires, intentions and actions (for instance, my brain is currently going through the processes which I experience as something like 'I think this proposal makes sense'. 'Type out the words, 'This proposal makes sense.' ' and so on). How it is that these brain processes have these experiential properties is currently a mystery (That is the hard problem of consciousness). But if these processes did not have their representational properties then they would not have the causal powers they have (for instance they would not allow me as much flexibility to inhibit or adjust my actions). Hence my conscious experiences have important causal influences on my actions." There is a paper online by M Sharlow: http://www.eskimo.com/~msharlow/papers/conscious_will.pdf I also comment in my e-book "Rethinking the Mind"