Are there properties, rather than the referents of terms, which can only be predicated of one thing?

for those who attach metaphysical weight to the distinction between expressing (predicates) and referring (singular terms), questions about the meanings (now often known as the ‘semantic values’) of singular terms like ‘honesty’ and ‘hunger’ and ‘being in love’ may be even more pressing. Since the chief task of singular terms is to refer to things, the semantic values of ‘honesty,’ ‘hunger’ and the like are presumably the things they refer to. But what could a word like ‘honesty’ refer to? If there are properties, it could refer to the property honesty

Heidegger seems adamant that no-one can die "my death" for me.

But can I predicate my death of me and only me? If not, how can Heidegger say he will die at noon? And if so, how could a philosopher argue that he will not?

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    Maybe "death" is not a property... – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Aug 30 '20 at 12:24
  • so it's an event? @MauroALLEGRANZA maybe i'm looking for something that can't be found. an unintuitive answer just from clarity? – user47711 Aug 30 '20 at 17:37
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    Yes; IMO it is more reasonable to call it an Event. – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Aug 30 '20 at 18:01
  • Aside from the status of death, already Plato had form-copies, such as the-large-in-Socrates, which were individualized to a particular. Alternatively, one can have generic properties the mode of possessing ("partaking") which is individualized. – Conifold Aug 30 '20 at 18:18
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    SEP explains it under the link. That something dead partakes in deadness as a form is the usual platonic thesis. But "my death" as such is indeed not a property. – Conifold Aug 30 '20 at 20:17

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