Are there properties, rather than the referents of terms, which can only be predicated of one thing?
for those who attach metaphysical weight to the distinction between expressing (predicates) and referring (singular terms), questions about the meanings (now often known as the ‘semantic values’) of singular terms like ‘honesty’ and ‘hunger’ and ‘being in love’ may be even more pressing. Since the chief task of singular terms is to refer to things, the semantic values of ‘honesty,’ ‘hunger’ and the like are presumably the things they refer to. But what could a word like ‘honesty’ refer to? If there are properties, it could refer to the property honesty
Heidegger seems adamant that no-one can die "my death" for me.
But can I predicate my death of me and only me? If not, how can Heidegger say he will die at noon? And if so, how could a philosopher argue that he will not?