You can much undrestand the concept of desire and motivation which is directed with being and nothingness. Hegel and Jean-Paul Sartre stadied these concepts.
In Hegelian philosophy, self-consciousness is desire in general”
To desire Being is to fill oneself with this given Being, to enslave oneself to it.. To desire non-Being is to liberate oneself from Being, to realized one’s autonomy, one’s Freedom. To be anthropogenetic, then, Desire must be directed toward a nonbeing –that is, toward another Desire, another greedy emptiness, another I . Desire is human, or more exactly, “huamanizing,” “anthropogenetic,” only provided that it is directed toward another Desire and an other Desire.
From Hegelian philosophy
In Desire, Consciousness stands in relation to itself as individual. It relates to an object devoid of self-hood, which is in and for itself another than the self-consciousness. The latter for this reason only, attains self-identity, as regards the object through destruction of the latter. Desire is in general (1) destructive, (2) in the gratification of its wants, therefore, it comes to the conscious feeling of its for-itself-being as individual - to the undefined Comprehension of the subject as connected with objectivity.
On the Kantian interpretation of Hegel’s moral psychology, reason is constitutive of the free will because it provides a privileged perspective from which to evaluate our natural desires
In Hegelian philosophy about motivation,
Hegel says that we should stop speaking of motivation in terms of drives and instead begin speaking of character.
Hegel’s attempt to find a form of practical rationality that is fluid and internal to motivation rather than fixed and external.
the immediate presentation of our motivations is indeterminate, and the job of rational willing is to resolve that indeterminacy. When we interpret this claim through the lens of Hegel’s attempt to find a form of practical rationality that is fluid and internal to motivation rather than fixed and external, the result is a picture in which the experience of our motivations is the experience of something malleable, and the free will is our ability to form our motivations in and through our experience of their force.
To reflect on a motive is a way of ‘acting on’ that motive in the dual sense of being behavior motivated by that motive and of shaping that motive.
The Two-Factor Theory of motivation (otherwise known as dual-factor theory or motivation-hygiene theory) was developed by psychologist Frederick Herzberg in the 1950s.
Acting On’ Instead of ‘Stepping Back’: Hegel’s Conception of the Relation between Motivations and the Free Will Christopher Yeomans
The hedonic principle—the desire to approach pleasure and avoid pain—is frequently presumed to be the fundamental principle upon which motivation is built
In Sartre's Theory of Motivation,
Sartre's theory of motivation revolves around the Schelerian‐inspired notion of affectivity and the peculiar way affectivity provides us access to evaluative properties of the objects in our environment
Man has a given nature which determines him to realize certain ends. The motives of his actions are, so to speak, "ready-made and prehuman"
Sartre's analysis of human motivation would be complete, each man's behavior being explicable in terms of and only in terms of an ultimate and irreducible project of being. Such is not the case. Sartre goes on to uncover a basic and universal structure present in every individual's project of being, and in doing so, he presents us with a second theory of human motivation. This universal structure is revealed in the experience of anguish when man encounters the exterior world as it is, stripped of the meaning which his per- sonal project of being confers upon it.
Sartre says that man's behavior cannot be motivated in any essential sense by the exterior world or past events because Sartre in moments of anguish encountered the exterior world as it is-in its full gratuitousness, contingence, or "absurdity
Sartre's Theory of Motivation
Daniel Vanello, The Southern journal of philosophy 57(2).
About Sartre's point of view about desire, He said:
"desire is socially shaped need"
Sartre therefore no longer terms the fundamental relationship between consciousness and its objects desire; instead he designates this relationship as one of need.
And Sartre maintains that while pure need is praetical in the sense of heing survival-oriented, desire is elhical in the sense ofheing value-making.
For Spinoza everything seeks to preserve itself, or everything seeks to maintain its particular relation of motion and rest among its parts. This drive toward self-preservation Spinoza calls ‘desire’.
Chapter Title: Paralogisms of Desire Book Title: Death and Desire in Hegel, Heidegger and Deleuze
Book Author(s): Brent Adkins Published by: Edinburgh University Press