I have been reading a lot about dialetheism lately. I know for a fact that dialetheists do not believe that every contradiction is true. (Surely there is a difference between asserting that Liar is true and 'Priest does karate and Priest does not do karate' is true)

In particular, it is my impression that Priest argues in The Logic of Paradox that only contradictions caused by self-referring paradoxes are true.

I would like confirmation/reference for the following:

  1. Is it true that dialetheists believe that the only true contradictions are the ones that are caused by self-reference? And is self-reference the only criterion that results in true contradiction?

  2. What does Priest think about allegedly-non-self-referring paradox like the Yablo paradox? Does he think it is true? If so, in virtue of what?

Thanks a lot!

  • 1
    1) No, self-reference paradoxes are just one example. Others include statements with vague predicates (e.g. 50 grains are and are not a heap), about transitional states, legal collisions, etc., see SEP. 2) Priest argued that Yablo's paradox is essentially self-referential, and not much different from the Liar, see his paper, so he does classify its sentences as true contradictions. Definitely non-self-referential Zeno's paradoxes are a more distinctive example – Conifold Oct 20 '20 at 19:34
  • @Conifold Thank you that's really helpful, appreciate it! – Daniel Mak Oct 21 '20 at 16:44

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