A short question about vacuously true.
(1)
I talk to every goblin every day.
(2)
I talked to every goblin yesterday.
Goblins don't exist. So universal claims like (1) and (2) are vacuously true, am I right?
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Sign up to join this communityA short question about vacuously true.
(1)
I talk to every goblin every day.
(2)
I talked to every goblin yesterday.
Goblins don't exist. So universal claims like (1) and (2) are vacuously true, am I right?
Set theory tells us that the empty set is a subset of every set, meaning that, whatever the set S may be, the empty set in included in S.
The set of goblins is identical to the empty set ( for there is no goblin).
So, the set of goblins is included in the set of people you talk, have talked or will talk to.
Now, why is the empty set included in any set whatever? The reason lies in the truth table of the " if ... then " operator ( material conditional). When the first sentence of an " if... then " statement is false, the conditional as a whole is automatically true. Consider an arbitrary object x , an arbitrary set S, and the (open)sentence
" if x belongs to the empty set, then x belongs to S"
The first sentence ( antecedent) is false ( for , by definition, no object belongs to the set that has no element); so the whole conditional is true. Since object x and set S were arbitrary, we are allowed to generalize and to say
"for all object x and all set S, if x belongs to the empty set, then x belongs to S"
That means that the conditions for set inclusion are fullfilled between the set " empty set" and any set S.