Regarding the mind-body-problem, Thomas Nagel argues against both materialism and ontological dualism, presenting a view which revolves around subjective phenomena (individualism).

Could these exclusively subjective phenomena be seen as epiphenomena, keeping the closeness of physical phenomena?

  • 1
    As of real pragmatists, I feel it is hard to pin them down in terms of definitive metaphysics. The position is standing kind of diametrically to classical ontology. Why do you feel it would be appropriate to try to apply an inherently materialistic concept to his philosophy in the first place? Just asking for context like motivation or background here.
    – Philip Klöcking
    Commented Nov 29, 2020 at 22:20
  • 1
    No. In a footnote to What Is It Like to Be a Bat? he writes:"if our idea of the physical ever expands to include mental phenomena, it will have to assign them an objective character - whether or not this is done by analyzing them in terms of other phenomena already regarded as physical. It seems to me more likely, however, that mental-physical relations will eventually be expressed in a theory whose fundamental terms cannot be placed clearly in either category." This suggests neutral monism rather than epiphenomenalism.
    – Conifold
    Commented Nov 30, 2020 at 1:25


You must log in to answer this question.

Browse other questions tagged .