According to Nietzsche, does "slave morality" work for his "slaves"?

I am trying to work out some sort of consistency to why his genealogy / criticism of morality means morality is in error. I thought that perhaps it's because the "untermensch" are really no better off with it: Goethe still appears and does great things, etc..

Or is trans-valuation valuable merely because it works for his "ubermensch"?

I was thinking of the ideal set of values as an equal force or reaction to the untermensch's power over what will be the ubermensch's feelings of power. So the latter is a response of e.g. unconcern for the pitiful.

  • I would like to ask you to be a bit more careful about the term "works for". In some sense, slave morality does, of course, work: On one hand, it works for the masters and limits humans in breaking the limits of conformity and their inherent potential to determine their own rules and destiny. On the other hand, it works for the slaves as they don't mind (or even reflect) that in their sheepish existence. But the real question is: Isn't enacting power the only real value? In other words: Does this picture allow for Hegelian sublimation, ie. a bigger, working picture? – Philip Klöcking Dec 10 '20 at 10:39

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