The notion of intentional content as distinct from intentional object is also important in relation to the issue of thought about and reference to non-existent objects. Examples of this include perceptual illusions, thought about fictional objects such as Hamlet or Lilliput, thought about impossible objects such as round-squares, and thought about scientific kinds that turn out not to exist such as phlogiston. What is common to each of these cases is that it seems possible to have meaningful experiences, thoughts and beliefs about these things even though the corresponding objects do not exist, at least not in any ordinary sense of ‘exist’.

Ref: https://iep.utm.edu/huss-int/

Can the same be said of the non-existence, e.g. absence, of non-existent objects, that it has a noesis and noema? Does that absence of something have a way of appearing, in the same manner that the moon can appear half or full, or we can think of Mark Twain as Samuel Clemens?

  • work with me here, please. i don't see what is wrong with the question, what mistake i've made other than asked something fringe – user49534 Dec 17 '20 at 7:02
  • do you really not understand the question, or is it just that you cannot answer it? i reached 2 people, then got a downvote, and still reached 2 people. someone had gone away, tried to google an answer, failed to, and so downvoted... if these were googlable questions i would not need to ask them, – user49534 Dec 17 '20 at 7:20
  • Source: iep.utm.edu/huss-int. Perhaps the absence is the object in this case, but not sure about it (know too few about Husserl). +1 – RodolfoAP Dec 17 '20 at 7:23
  • thanks! would be amazing if we don't we just get on with it... but not likely @RodolfoAP i guess it's much more likely to be a quality of Being – user49534 Dec 17 '20 at 9:50
  • I've added the reference. Context may help some readers. – Geoffrey Thomas Dec 17 '20 at 10:50

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