- There is a well known modal fallacy regarding knowledge which says that if some subject s knows that p, then p cannot be false, and therefore , p is a necessarily true proposition.
Source : [ by Schwartz, author of Possible Worlds] https://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/modal_fallacy.htm#knows
I want to talk about this other fallacy : if s knows that p, then s is necessarily right about p.
Sure, it is true that " necessarily ( if s knows that p, s is right about p) ", but that does not mean that " if s knows that p, then s is necessarily right about p". In other words , knowledge does not require infaillibility.
However, I cannot prevent myself from feeling a tension between : (1) s mustn't be right by luck ( knowledge requires a justification) and (2) s need not to be necessarily right.
How can a justification yield a belief that is contingently right.
Certainly, there must be some room between random contingency ( getting it right by luck) and necessity. How to make this idea precise? Could concepts pertaining to probability be helpfull here?