Yes, Protagoras, Plato, Becccaria, Bentham, and Sidgwick.
It might be handy to fix ideas about just what we're talking about - to make sure we are talking about the same thing. On H.L.A. Hart's account, a retributive theory of punishment - which in context you means by 'justice' as your text box makes clear - has at least three components:
R1: A person may be punished if and only if he has voluntarily done
R2: The punishment must match, or be equivalent to, the wickedness
of the offense.
R3: The justification for punishing persons is that the return of suffering for moral evil voluntarily done is itself just or morally
good (Hart: 231).
Beccaria and Bentham
The first intellectual assaults on the retributive theory of punishment in modern times are those of Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham:
Beccaria, much like Bentham after him, seeks to eliminate
the vengeful, retributive element in public punishment and to replace it with a
milder, non-vindictive deterrent justification (Vick: 39).
On Beccaria, see Crimes and Punishents (1764) and on Bentham, The Rationale of Punishment (written 1774-6). Details about Bentham are already given in another answer.
Closer to the twentieth century, in the Anglo-American tradition of theorising about punishment, the earliest firm rejection by a major philosopher of the retributive theory, so far as I know, is Henry Sidwick's in The Methods of Ethics (1874/ 1907). From the 1907 edition:
History shows us a time in which it was thought not
only as natural but as clearly right and incumbent on a man to
requite injuries [Hart's 'suffering': GT] as to repay benefits; but as moral reflection
developed in Europe, this notion was repudiated, so that Plato taught that it
could never be right really to harm anyone, however he may have harmed us. But in its
universal form the old conviction still lingers in the popular
view of Criminal Justice. It is still widely held that justice
requires pain to be inflicted on a man who has done wrong, even
if no benefit result either to himself or to others from the pain.
Personally, I am so far from holding this view that I have a
strqng instinctive aversion from it: and I hesitate to attribute
it to Common Sense, since I think it is gradually passing away
from the moral consciousness of educated persons in most
advanced communities' (Sidgwick: III.5.5: 281).
Prima facie it would appear from Sidgwick's statement that Plato rejected a
retributive theory of punishment insofar as he forbears from inflicting harm and
it is a reasonable reading of the retributive theory of punishment that it does
involve the intentional infliction of harm.
Let's delve a little deeper. In Plato's Protagoras, Protagoras states the view:
In punishing wrongdoers, no one concentrates on the fact that a man has done
wrong in the past, or punishes him on that account, unless taking blind vengeance
like a beast. No, punishment is not inflicted by a rational man for the sake of the
crime that has been committed (after all one cannot undo what is past), but for the
sake of the future, to prevent either the same man or, by the spectacle of his
punishment, someone else from doing wrong again. But to hold such a view
amounts to holding that virtue can be instilled by education; at all events the
punishment is inflicted as a deterrent.
If 'blind vengeance' is retribution, here the retributive theory of punishment is clearly rejected. But is the view Protagoras'? Scholars disagree (Stalley: 2-3).
What is reasonably clear is that Plato really did hold the view attributed to him by Sidgwick, namely that punishment must never harm but should only be employed for the good of the person punished:
There are ... scattered remarks about punishment
in the Republic [380a-b, 409e-410a, 445a, 591a-b] as well as a comprehensive and complex account in the
Laws [731b-d, 735e, 843d, 854a, 862b-863a 933e, 941d, 957e]. Common to all these accounts is an insistence that punishment
should aim primarily at the good of those on whom it is inflicted, though it
may also serve as a deterrent to others (Stalley: 14).
There is no thought here that the return of suffering for moral evil voluntarily done is itself just or morally good. There is by the strongest implication a rejection of the very idea, with which the quote from the 'Protagoras' makes clear that he was acquainted. Among the Greeks I am unable to recall any prefiguring of this view of Plato's, so Plato can perhaps stand as a philosopher, and in the Western tradition possibly the first, to challenge the theory of retributive punishment - or retributive justice as you also call it.
H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.
H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981.
R. F. Stalley, 'Punishment in Plato's "Protagoras", Phronesis , 1995, Vol. 40, No. 1 1995, pp. 1-19.
J. Vick, '"Putting Cruelty First": Liberal Penal Reform and the Rise of the Carceral State', Social Justice , 2015, Vol. 42, No. 1 (139) (2015), pp. 35-52.