Is there a name of the view that no statement is true? Such a person who holds that view believes that statement are meaningless sequences of marks on paper or a computer monitor and can't be true, anymore than a pen is true or a table is true. Such a person does believe that e.g., 2+2=4, but they don't believe that "2+2=4" is true. Is there a name in the literature for this view?
You seem to be talking about “truth” in the isomorphic [1:1] word-world [or world-concept] correspondence theory's sense of [scientific] realism. See: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/#AntiFoilForScieReal. And the problem with that position is most often purported to be that we simply do not have access to the “view from nowhere/everywhere" – commonly called the “god's-eye” POV. We cannot stand outside our concepts and perceptions to pass judgment about whether or not they comport/correspond to the way the world "really" is. Whether they are "true."
So we can never know whether or when the 1:1 correspondence between our word/concepts and the world is actually ever achieved. It may in fact be that the way “the world” is in actuality, (rather than merely our construct of it using the tools we have [eg. senses, reason, imagination]), makes, for instance, “2+2=4” true) but, we can/could never, strictly speaking, “know” it.
Hence, it is primarily against this variety of the concept of “truth” to which the epistemological nihilism/radical skepticism referenced in @GettnDer's answer above is traditionally deployed. The solution to the ipso facto unsolvable puzzle created by the correspondence theory of truth, has been to dissolve it instead, by redefining the concept "truth." See, for instance, the the Semantic Theory of truth, the Deflationary Theory of truth, the Coherence Theory of truth, and the Pragmatic Theory of truth (discussed, inter alia, here: https://iep.utm.edu/truth/).
Or compare “realism” (as discussed in the SEP citation above), to the various forms of "anti realism" also discussed therein. For instance, consider, in epistemology, or the philosophy of science, that constructivism is a view which maintains that [scientific] knowledge ([justified]true belief]) is literally constructed by the [scientific] community, that who seeks to measure and construct models [ideal representations] of the natural world, rather than attempt to determine what the world is "really" like. That is, truth is “created,” not "discovered to exist." See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructivism.
One of the consequences of this shift in stance is that while knowledge used to be defined simply as "true belief," 'it is now an epistemic concept defined as "jusified true belief." Which has given rise to its own set of issues (See the Gettier problems: https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/).
It might also be instructive here to consider modern philosophies shift from epistemological internalism to epistemological externalism/reliablism. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internalism_and_externalism#Epistemology and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reliabilism).
Epistemological nihilism is a form of philosophical skepticism according to which knowledge does not exist, or, if it does exist, it is unattainable for human beings. It should not be confused with epistemological fallibilism, according to which all knowledge is uncertain.
As I understand it, Solopism is specific to thinking your existence is the only thing that is certain (although you can further argue that only doubt is certain, as the self could also be an illusion).
The distinction between Epistemological nihilism and Epistemological/Radical Skepticism being about certainty rather than the fundamental existence of truth.