When one wants to take a synoptic view of the history of epistemology, one notices that Aristotle's contribution is almost always explained in terms of scientific knowledge resting on demonstration.
What Aristotle says about cogniton in De Anima is not much taken into account ( for this reason , I think, that this part of Aristotle's doctrine is refered to psychology, not to epistemology).
However, I think it is necessary to take into account the De Anima treatise in order to determine how Aristotle understood knowledge as " knowledge of" something ( while Posterior Analytics treat of knowledge as " knowledge that" , knowledge of a proposition).
What I would like to know is (1) whether Arstotle has a general term ( in Greek) for knowledge, a term equivalent to the latin term " cognitio"? (2) in case he has such a term, does he consider sensation as a kind of knowledge ( understood boadly, but properly ) ? Are sensible powers ( of the soul) cognitive powers according to Aristotle?
Medieval thinkers standardly talked about " cognitive" powers comprising (1) sensible powers ( sensibility) and (2) intellectual powers; each one having an apprehensive aspect and a judicating or discriminating aspect.
Is the medieval picture true to original aristotelianism? Is there a general concept of cognition in Aristotle - manely " reception of the form of the object" - that officially applies both to sensation and intellection?
Note : my question is not as to whether Aristotle defines sensation / perception as the reception of the form of the object, since it seems obvious he does; my question is as to whether this kind of form reception officially counts as knowledge / cognition in his doctrine.