Excerpt from section 37 "Logical Ranges. Notes on the Theory of Measurement" of "The Logic of Scientific Discovery":
If a statement "p" is more easy to falsify than a statement "q", because is of a higher level of universality or precision, then the class of the basic statements permitted by "p" is a proper subclass of the class of the basic statements permitted by "q".
I don't quite get how Popper makes this assertion. Take the following two statements:
- Plane geometry shapes are made of lines
- Squares are made of lines
Clearly, #1 is more universal than #2. But doesn't #1 permit more basic statements than #2?
From #1, I can deduce:
- Triangles are made of lines
- Rectangles are made of lines
- Polygons are made of lines
How can the class of basic statements permitted by #1 be a subclass of the class of basic statements permitted by #2?