Can anyone explain the argument in section 50 of PI, as it seems important enough not to gloss over (that "if this thing did not exist we could not use it in our language game- - what looks like as if it had to exist is part of our language".)
The second paragraph begins "One would, however, like to say: existence cannot be attributed to an element, for if it did not exist, one could not even name it and so one could say nothing at all of it", and Wittgenstein then goes on to try to show that some things are neither one thing nor not that thing (again I don't understand this - but this time because I don't understand what is being said, rather than if he is saying it's the case).
My grandfather does not exist, and can be named.
Does anything hinge on this, besides whether or not anything can be simple or composite, on which I agree with him anyway (what something is composed of is a matter of perspective, 64 squares or 2 colours, and likewise a visual image of a tree is composite or simple dependent on what you mean and the language game you are involved with: this seems about right - if you're counting trees e.g.)?