Moral facts seem weird because they don't seem to mesh too well with a purely physicalist ontology (although there is such a thing as ethical naturalism). It somehow seems odd that alongside the facts of fundamental physics, chemistry, and biology, there are additional facts like 'it is wrong to cause gratuitous harm'. On the other hand, it seems blatantly obvious (to me at least) that there are true moral facts; that it's wrong to cause gratuitous harm or that child abuse is wrong seems as clear to me as 2+2=4. We're usually rational in believing things that seem blatantly obvious to us (in the absence of any defeaters), but, so some arguments go, physicalism is a defeater for moral realism - fundamental physics is the whole story, and moral facts just aren't derivable from physics.
It seems to me that most philosophers throughout history would not have been physicalists (they didn't have the benefit of hindsight we do, i.e. a nearly complete scientific explanation of the world, and many of them were religious and and so probably believed in at least some supernatural beings). Since they wouldn't have been physicalists, the argument from physicalism sketched in the first paragraph wouldn't have been an issue.
So... I'm wondering, before physicalism (and the metaphysical and epistemological problems it poses for moral realism) became so dominant, were most philosophers moral realists? Did they trust their moral "senses" in the same (or a similar) way they trusted their physical and intellectual senses?