You might like to consider Samuel Johnson's retort to Berkeley's subjective idealism: "I refute it thus!" * kicks stone *. This has been called the logical fallacy 'appeal to the stone'. But I think calling it a fallacy misses the point, which is that if there are regularities to the physical world which are unaffected by minds, they are functionally equivalent to a world independent of mind.
I would point out we can have no access to data not filtered through a mind, a subjectivity. This is important when we consider the nature of time, and whether it is something we use to organise experience, or fundamentally 'out there'. But, even that kind of radical scepticism about time and attendant causation, still leaves the regularities of nature as effectively unaffected by subjective experience. Conservation laws of energy & momentum are in some way neccessary preconditions for perceptions, so independent of them.
Yogacara philosophy, the stance of most Mahayana Buddhist schools is called the 'mind only' school takes this stance, that mental experience or subjectivity is fundamental - this is an important corrective to the idea there is a fundamentally objective reality, even though no one can experience it (the idea is a hang-over from monotheism). But the solipsist implication of this, is corrected by the 'chain of dependent origination', and functioning of karma which is of many types, like earthquakes aren't necessarily a judgement but are a necessary consequence of earth's magnetic field which allowed life to arise at all. Personal karma, is like the Stoic recognition, that we can't control events but we can control our response, and that in the long term that recognition can help us free ourselves from being conditioned by events.
An idealist like Plato or Berkeley, has to relate the patterns of external reality to internal patterns. For Plato experiences we have relate to the qualities we have in our soul or essential nature. For Berkeley, the external regularities are from God, and can be appealed to for exceptions. Tegmark & modern mathematical idealists take a subtler view, that there are larger realities of all possible events and laws, and regularities across extents of that domain. Tegmark's idea of universalising abstractions, doesn't leave space for magical thinking, because no consistent domain can allow it (any regularised & predictable 'magic' just becomes causation, ie the 'no miracles' argument of Hume).