Is Nick Bostrom's simulation hypothesis a solipsistic idea? This hypothesis says that only I have consciousness, and all other people are unconscious philosophical zombies? Which version of the simulation hypothesis is more plausible: 1.Solipsistic in which all but me are philosophical zombies. 2. Nonsoliptic where all people, like me, have consciousness, sensation, thoughts and emotions.
It is, in the way you put it, undoubtedly solipsistic. Solipsism is very hard to argue about in a logical framework, as the solipsistic side always has the choice of claiming that the logic itself is a product of their own mind. So this is always outside the scope of logic.
To analyse the two cases you pointed out, we do not even need to consider the validity of simulation hypothesis. It is no different than the paradigm of Abrahamic religions: A creator -who is omnipotent- created the universe with a set of rules and parameters, can interfere with its processes anytime it desires. The positive or logical approaches you can utilize do not seem to matter, as despite of the background, questions of the solipsistic person is the same:
- Is my perception all there is? or
- Do these people have the same experiences as I do, or are they not sentient unlike me?
As you can see, regardless of the ontological or epistemological paradigm (i.e. Abrahamic religion or simulation hypothesis), you can still ask the same questions. As long as you cannot get to experience the qualia of other people, you may still question their reality. That is why, I cannot see any reason why one might be more plausible than other, i.e. coming up with a statistical "likelihood" seems impossible.
Second one happens to be more solid in a logical framework though, as we can measure through EEG, fMRI etc. that similar experiences give rise to similar neural activity in different people. However then again, one can argue that these all are "the products of their own mind". There is no way of arguing against that under the assumptions of logic.
To summarize, both the simulation hypothesis and solipsism are outside the scope of science, or even philosophy, as these matters turn out to be beliefs at the end of the day.
Well. Thomas Breuer had shown that for any observer the system which properly includes themselves has different physical properties (and is not predictable) due to self-reference. This is a mathematical result.
This means, that from the point of view of any observer, all others with whom he can interact are predictable (probabiblistically or deterministically). In other words, Turing-simulable. In other words, machines or zombies that just follow physical laws.
But if we consider the Many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, we can have several such observers in the multiverse. But they will never meet in the same branch of wavefunction (or, rather, if they occasionally meet for a moment, they instantly diverge, so they cannot observe each other's behavior).