You are mixing two questions here. There is the quote about historical revisionism and there is the reparation (compensation) payment by the Jesuit order they feel compelled to.
The intersection between these problems is the ethical question of how to deal with "historical guilt", ie. obviously unethical acts committed by people that are long dead but in relation to us either because we share organisational or ancestral bonds.
What the first quote is about is demanding a bare minimum: We should not revise (ignore, negate) history just because it features episodes that are unpleasant, since that way, the past mistakes are forgotten but not undone. In other words: We should at a minimum acknowledge and learn from the mistakes of the past, since not doing that is indeed "one of the worst, and dangerous, mistakes one can make". This includes the general attitude that past atrocities had or should have no bearing on the present life.
The other ethical problem is another beast. Generally, it is acknowledged that people deserve compensation for crimes committed against them. This includes compensation by organisations (or their legal successor), as shown eg. by the need of handing back works of arts to the families of the original Jew owners by German state museums. Or the (ongoing!) German compensation of the church for its dispossession during the Emperor's times (over 200 years ago).
The moral duty of present individuals to compensate present decendents of past victims of crimes, on the other hand, is disputable. It has some grounding in above reasoning: It is a way to show that you, individually, acknowledge and are willing to act on, ie. positively prevent these past mistakes made by others. It is important to point out here that it is not the only way to do so. There are some border cases eg. of past (individual) slave traders or past company owners who used forced labour in Nazi Germany, ie. ancestors whose atrocities still have direct consequences for their family (inherited wealth), while having negative consequences (because of traumata that have consequences over generations) for the descendants of those who suffered. There are good reasons to assume that there is a direct moral duty to compensate between individual descendants there, but that is still debatable.
What we speak about here, though, is an organisation that acknowledges the moral guilt of a predecessor organisation not only in word, but in deed. Whether there is, as a matter of fact, a moral or even legal duty for that is not even relevant here. One party has made clear that they feel they should be compensated, the other decided that they indeed feel the same. The only question that remains is "how much" but that, with all due respect, seems not to be a genuinely moral problem anymore, considering the sums we are talking about.