Ethical principle about "it's wrong for one if it is harmful if everyone does it"

Question

I seem to recall that there is an ethical principle (in some systems) that while one person might do something with minimal, but still negative, effect, it is still wrong if it is the case that it would be harmful if everyone did the same thing.

An example is throwing trash on the street, though there are more serious examples.

I'm looking for both a name of such a principle (and the system in which it arises) and some information explaining it and the background.

It's been a long time since I studied ethics.

Based on some early answers here, and some additional thought, I think that the case where an action by one (or a few) has no negative effects at all, but vastly negative ones when "everyone" does it, might be a different situation altogether.

---

My special interest here is about copyright infringement by academics of academic materials. If one person does it there is a small negative effect. But if everyone does it then there is no longer any incentive for publishers to publish things in the first place, which would be problematic in academia. A different system would be preferable, most likely, but it is hard to see how it emerges or who absorbs the cost as well as there responsibility to maintain access over very long time spans.

Answer 1

This is Kant's categorical imperative, and more specifically, universalizability.

"Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law."

Answer 2

Welcome, Buffy.

False first appearances

At first sight the kind of case you describe is an example of the 'collective action problem':

[There are cases that have] the following structure: A certain number of people - perhaps a large number of people - have the ability to perform an act of a given kind. And if a large enough group of people do perform the act in question then the results will be bad overall. However - and this is the crucial point - in the relevant cases it seems that it makes no difference to the outcome what any given individual does. And this is true regardless of whether others are doing the act or not. Thus, if enough people do perform the act the results are bad overall; but for all that, it remains true of each individual agent that it makes no difference to the overall results whether or not they perform the action in question. (Shelley Kagan, 'Do I Make a Difference?', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2011, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 105-141: 107.)

The collective action problem is widely regarded as a problem for consequentialism:

The problem, in effect, is this: consequentialism condemns my act only when my act makes a difference. But in the kind of cases we are imagining, my act makes no difference, and so cannot be condemned by consequentialism - even though it remains true that when enough such acts are performed the results are bad. Thus consequentialism fails to condemn my act. In cases of this sort, therefore, consequentialism seems to fail even by its own lights. For here - unlike the deontological cases that purport to show that something else matters besides results - the act seems wrong precisely because of the bad results of everyone's doing acts of the same sort. Yet consequentialism still cannot condemn the act. Apparently, then, consequentialism fails to handle a kind of case that even consequentialists admit it ought to be able to handle. (Kagan: 108.)

A second look

However, the case you describe is not one where what the individual does 'makes no difference'. Instead it's one where the individual's action is 'of minimal effect'. An action doesn't have to be of major effect to count morally. An action 'of minimal effect' is still an action that does have results. If the results are harmful, all else equal the action is wrong on consequentialist grounds and may well be open to objection on deontological grounds as well.

The kind of case you raise first received serious and extended attention in Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons (1984) and the solution to it - or at least the response I've given here - follows his own answer to it.

A title

As analysed above, the example falls within the scope of consequentalism and violates its requirements. It does so irrespective of any principle of uiversalisability. Even if no-one else did your action 'of minimal effect', all else equal it would still be wrong because it produces a bad (if minimal then still real and still bad) consequence. One might appeal to a principle of the moral relevance of minimal effect.

Answer 3

When I was in my twenties, I spent a lot of time thinking about this rule. Or Kant's categorical imperative which is the fancy way of calling it. Ultimately I came the conclusion that I disagreed with it. A lot of activities are harmless/good when some people do it but not if everyone does it. Some examples

• It's ok when some people become full-time artists. However if everyone would be a full-time artist there would be no nurses, firemen, factory-workers, software developers and other people who perform necessary work left.

• There is nothing wrong when you withdraw all your money from the bank. However if everyone would do it at the same time the economic system would collapse.

Answer 4

Take a football team. Eleven players, and one is the goal keeper. Having eleven goal keepers would make an awful football team, but having none is awfully bad as well. So "I will be the goal keeper" is damaging if everyone does it, but very benefical if one of a team of 11 does it.

Take an orchestra. If everyone wants to be the conductor, you won't get any music. If nobody acts as the conductor, the quality of a performance will be nowhere near as good as it could be.

I think you will be able to find plenty of examples where something is harmful if everyone does it, but benefical if one person does it.