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I really like Kant, but I'm having a hard time understanding his Critique of Metaphysics. Kant takes as illegitimate the transcendental use of the concepts of pure understanding. This seems to be the whole point of the Critique of Pure Reason, though. I have some questions about this.

  1. Isn't the claim that there is something beyond our possible experience a grave and quite uncritical metaphysical claim?
  2. Kant claims a difference of usage of ideas of reason for fruitful endeavours while setting ground to the sciences(KrV, B 676), but how to distinguish constitutive and regulative uses of reason?
  3. How isn't the whole critique directed itself to the Critique of Pure Reason, since it does not yield knowledge? Is the CRP's sole purpose to ground Newtonian physical theories?

I believe Kant to be one of the biggest philosophers in History, and I am in no way claiming I have any valid critiques. I just know he thought about this and there is a reasonable answer, as I should expect from such a great philosopher.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-metaphysics/

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    Don't apologize for questioning a "big name." Arguing and disagreeing, also known as "critical thinking," has a long and decorated history among philosophers. Modern philosophers would not entirely agree with Kant (or, often, with each other) so why would you? To decide on a philosophical position for yourself, you must evaluate everything according to what makes sense to you alone. There are no arguments from authority in philosophy. However, do not take this necessarily as support of your specific objections here.
    – causative
    Commented Mar 20, 2021 at 2:22
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    This is probably a translation problem: In German "transzendent" means "beyond all knowledge" and Kant invented "transzendental", which basically is supposed to mean "basis of or behind all knowledge". Both are translated as "transcendental" in English.
    – Philip Klöcking
    Commented Mar 20, 2021 at 6:42
  • Relevant: What is knowledge according to Kant
    – Philip Klöcking
    Commented Mar 20, 2021 at 10:59
  • re ur question1, metaphysical claim is nothing but educated speculation in plain language which seems of value. One can even go far enough to claim most valuable mental activity for human is this educated speculation, other mental exercises such as reasoning and logic can be replaced by machines sooner or later. Re ur question 3, CPR seems to ground Newtonian physics in support of space absolutism, however, it quickly encountered critique from scholars with other views (britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-physics/What-is-space). Commented Mar 20, 2021 at 23:09
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    In the part of CRP called " tr. methodology" there is a chapter entitled " architectonics of pure reason " where kant explains clearly his project. You will see that Kant is far from being an enemy of metaphysics; rather, his project is to provide metaphysics with a solid foundation. Commented Mar 21, 2021 at 8:25

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  1. Wittgenstein wrote about his Tracatus: The point of the book is ethical... My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits. In short, I believe that where many others today are just gassing, I have managed in my book to put everything firmly in place by being silent about it. Your objection to Kant seems to be that he draws these bounds - as Peter Strawson famously put it, bounds of sense - from a point that cannot exist if these bounds are drawn properly (as Strawson himself thought, cf. his Bounds of Sense). It's disputable whether Kant is truly addressed by this objection (see his discussion of the positive and the negative notion of the noumenon at the very end of the Analytic of Principles - he defines the unconditioned, the unknowable, i.e. draws the bounds of sense, primarily by reference to what is knowable and conditioned by sensibility, apparently just like Wittgenstein), and whether it's sound, but the most probable reason why he cannot just say what Wittgenstein says in the seventh proposition of his Tractatus immediately after the Transcendental Analytic is that indeed he explores the extrasensible realm, although not through theoretical, but practical, cognition, in his works on practical philosophy. I don't think this is founded on an unjustified metaphysical claim, although I'd encourage you (or anyone reading) to explore Kant's own arguments for it, especially in the Doctrine of Method of the first Critique and the Groundwork. Your remark seems to sadly be a bit too general to give a more concrete answer.
  2. Kant discusses these issues in a very significant appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason called On the regulative use of the ideas of pure reason. In short: in its regulative use, Reason directs the Understanding towards a point, a limit, that is never reached and never can be reached in experience, i.e. the idea of an exhaustive totality of cognitions, on which our scientific inquiry slowly converges, but which is never actual. In its constitutive use, these ideas would assume this point as not only as a posited limit on which our knowledge converges, and which helps us make sense of progress in empirical science, but as a true object of knowledge which would then be metaphysical knowledge achieved by Reason alone (as knowledge acquired by experience is always finite whereas metaphysical knowledge is understood as knowledge of the unconditioned). This is, unsurprisingly, quite similar to the later ideas of Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper, who both were readers of Kant.
  3. Not exactly, but the Transcendental Deduction isn't complete until categories are linked to pure time-determinations in the Analytic of Principles. By doing that, Kant establishes principles that then function as further premises in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. In this sense, indeed, an important part of the Critique of Pure Reason contributes mostly to establishing that Newtonian natural science can provide scaffolding for a sound and comprehensive description of the world (which is ultimately the goal of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science).
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  1. Isn't the claim that there is something beyond our possible experience a grave and quite and quite uncritical metaphysical claim?

Why is this grave? And why is this uncritical. Plenty of things are beyond my possible experience. I do not know and will never know what conditions are like for another planet on the other side of the universe. But of course this is not quite what Kant means by possible experience, as he would say, if I were teleported there I would be able to experience the conditions.

A more serious objection, is that I cannot possibly know by direct experience what condituons are like in heaven or hell. Remember, Kant was writing in a much more Christianised era.

Further, Kant already knew this which is why he found it surprising he could assert that there were truths outside the realm of human experience because they ground them. These are his synthetic a priori truths.

  1. Kant claims a difference of usage of ideas of reason for fruitful endeavours while setting ground to the sciences(KrV, B 676), but how to distinguish constitutive and regulative uses of reason?

I don't know. I haven't looked at this.

  1. How isn't the whole critique directed itself to the Critique of Pure Reason, since it does not yield knowledge? Is the CRP's sole purpose to ground Newtonian physical theories?

I would dispute that Kant's theory is not a kind of knowledge. The notion of a synthetic and a priori truth is already knowledge not found elsewhere.

Why do you claim, "it does not yield knowledge?"

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