Which specific branch of philosophy defines the 'realness' of something?

Question

One or two years ago I read an article about what was termed a newer branch of philosophy that examined not only what was real, but what took precedence in importance in certain areas depending on this 'realness'.

'Country', 'confidence', 'The Pope', 'President' and 'Kings' were examples of things that weren't real.

The grounds for this were complex but the basic rule of thumb was that if all human memory was wiped, including external written and cultural memory of any form and also 'internal' conceptual memory, then anything that didn't remain wasn't real.

It also classified different types of 'realnesses' e.g. if this scenario somehow occurred then it's arguable that things like 'Country' and 'King' etc. would re-emerge, so there is a certain psychological reality to these, whereas it's unlikely that 'Santa Claus' would return and therefore this was less classed as less'real'.

It also argued that it was morally(?) wrong for the requirements of anything less real to dictate to anything more real e.g. if a human (real) is being told to adopt the belief in a country (not real) by the state (not real) then it's wrong on the grounds that the human should take precedence. It also argued that for optimum mental health, given that the brain's function is to keep the organism alive and that the brain would conceivably most often tend toward presenting the observer (whatever that means) with an accurate representation of reality as possible, which would avoid delusions like 'Country', then anytime cultural indoctrination or brain-washing is attempted then it'd wrong on the grounds that it reverses the imperatives of reality.

This subject defined 'Country' as something along the lines of a political mechanism or convention that arises more or less organically to fulfill a need and if the belief has to be forced on the people then there'd be something wrong with the concept, not the people.

The crucial part of all of this was the precedence of importance and the article lambasted the theory even although I thought it was quite insightful.

So, in short, can anyone please tell me to which branch this belongs, or even better, do they know of the article and can therefore provide a link? I think that the theorist was Japanese, but can't be sure.

Answer 1

Firstly, the general branch in philosophy you're seeking is Ontology. Ontology is the branch of metaphysics that explores the reality of things in the world.

Now the specific type of ontology you describe here seems like some sort of a hierarchical critical/objective-idealism. For example, consider a Kantian framework where the things that exist depend on the mind of the "I"; but those things share universal validity of realism. Perhaps a bit close to the framework you describe is Cassirer's Symbolic Forms, or (from a different angle) Husserl's Phenomenology. I'd also advise you to look at SEP's article on concepts.

This is a very complex (and imho hard to argue for) ontological framework. Moreover, the ethical and political implications derived from it are an entirely different thing. You can hold a hierarchical framework of "realness" without deriving ethical implications from it.

An anecdote (that I now learned) - turns out that modern Japanese philosophy was very influenced by German Idealism, which is quite fitting for this type of ontology.

Answer 2

I don't recognize a particular theory from your description, but contrary to Y. Weiss, I would say this sounds like the exact opposite of German Idealism, more of a throwback to crude empiricism and anti-Platonism.

Given that is appears to have a moral-practical dimension based on "realness," I would suspect it as the basis of a reactionary political stance, as when Thatcher argues "there is no such thing as society" only individuals and families, thereby eliminating the need for any "social" concerns or policies. It is like saying there is no such thing as forests, only trees.

There is a long history of anti-idealism, which denies primacy to "forms" or collective, abstract ideas like "horse" or "ungulate" as opposed to this of that particular animal. The attempt to erase all universalist "ideas" and rebuilt from "reality" is the sort of anti-rationalist move undertaken by Locke and other liberal empiricists. By "real" they begin with the certainties of the senses and assume a "nominalist" stance towards words and concepts, especially those that have assumed an unaccountable, dogmatic authority, such a kingship or papacy.

This idea quickly runs into trouble, as Berkeley and Hume demonstrate its internal paradoxes and the slippery slope to absolute skepticism. Then Kant makes the definitive case for underlying a priori concepts, such as space and time, that are necessary to form any coherent idea of what we call "experience," as the sensory experience of "real" things. Kant himself framed a coherent idea of "reality" of sorts and a bulwark against dogmatic rationalism, yet he pretty much demolished the recourse to naive realism.

Still, the appeals to realism constantly recur in philosophy, usually as a corrective to the excesses of speculation and often with an undercurrent of conservatism. The "phenomenalism" (not phenomenology) of 19th century physics took a similar stance with regard to any theoretical luggage beyond "real" or perceptible objects, so that Mach, for example, refused to believe in atoms as hypothesized by Boltzmann and even after Einstein's convincing demonstration of their actual existence.

Mach was then the godfather of certain branches of logical positivism, which similarly tried to separate out the "real" from the figmental or nominal and classify "more real" and "less real," as Russell and others took it, ridding the world of unicorns!

So, this only places the theory you describe in a very broad, very simplified lineage, if that helps. I am sure there are many resurrections of the "realist" project and may be quite interesting, but it is, as I say, often a stalking horse for political conservatism and explicitly opposed to all the supposed horrors wrought by German Idealism after Kant. As with the Thatcher doctrine, what gets tossed out as "unreal" or "less real" is generally a matter of convenience, like justifying whatever you want with selected Bible passages.