A funny joke consists of:
- A premise P that, for maximum humor, should be in some way familiar or relatable
- A conclusion Q, that in some way involves injury, harm, embarrassment, or some other taboo
- A "childlike" way to heuristically infer Q from P, which we may symbolize P ⊢ Q. A sensible adult would normally not conclude Q from P, but the joke does so perhaps by neglecting some common-sense information, or reasoning in a way different from usual, yet still partly justified by some aspect of P.
- An element of surprise in the inference, where the crucial part of P ⊢ Q was not anticipated, even as a possibility, by the listener. In some real-life cases it is conceivable that P caused Q in actual physical fact, but P ⊢ Q should still not be what a sensible adult would expect to happen.
Is this "childlike inference" theory of humor associated with a philosopher who states it in approximately these terms?