I've seen the term "ontic predicate" bandied around in some works. Whenever it has a clear definition it seem no different than how one would define it in (first-order) logic, i.e. it being about a relation. Is there any other definition for "ontic predicate" that is not ambiguous and reasonably widespread?
Are ontic predicates similarly (or even well) defined across philosophers? Do they differ from logic predicates?
I haven't seen this term used other than by Mertz or in discussions of his instance ontology, see e.g. Two Versions of an Argument for Particularism:"According to the doctrine, universals are not ontic predicates; i.e., they lack adicity. It would be more accurate for Mertz to say that universals provide the foundations of the adicities of unit relations." Unless we count Heidegger, who had something else in mind.– ConifoldApr 18, 2021 at 23:46
This is a paper discussing Heidegger's Being as Ontological Predicate (jstor.org/stable/43154947?seq=1). "It's usually assumed Kant denies that "being" is a real or determining predicate, he affirms that it merely is a logical or grammatical one. Now if Heidegger's interpretation was right, there would seem to be misinterpretations..."– Double KnotApr 19, 2021 at 2:58
@Conifold: it surely appeared earlier; e.g. in a 1970s paper of Chung-ying Cheng. It's also not clear if anyone using it is espousing any Heideggerian ontic vs ontological distinction (probably not).– FizzApr 19, 2021 at 7:15