What do you call the fact that you can't derive all the laws of other sciences from the law of physics? Is there a word or a term or something else that explains why this is the case? I would be interested if there ever was a philosophical discussion on this.
Your description sounds like anti-reductionism:
Antireductionism is the position in science and metaphysics that stands in contrast to reductionism (anti-holism) by advocating that not all properties of a system can be explained in terms of its constituent parts and their interactions.
Karl Popper was a famous proponent of antireductionism. In his essay Of clouds and clocks, Popper classified phenomena into two types: "clock" phenomena with a mechanical basis and "cloud" phenomena which are indivisible and depend upon emergence for explanation.
For example, Popper thought that a materialist explanation of consciousness is not possible. The view of reductionists about consciousness is explained by Max Velmans:
"Most reductionists accept that consciousness seems to be different from brain states (or functions) but claim that science will discover it to be nothing more than a state or function of the brain. In short, they mostly accept that brains states and conscious states are conceivably different, but deny that they are actually different (in the universe we happen to inhabit)."
As for some other philosophical arguments for anti-reductionsim:
physicist and philosopher Thomas Kuhn hold that science is not a self-contained entity, because the theories it uses are creations of the human mind, not inevitable results of experiment and observation, and the criteria for adoption of a particular theory are not definitive in selecting between alternatives, but require subjective input.
Also Leibniz once emphasized self-consciousness cannot be reduced to mechanics governing extended matter from his famous mill argument.
The term you are looking for is "Pluralism". It is the thesis that the Reductionist dream of the unity of sciences (and of reduction of everything else to science, in the scientism version of this dream), has and will forever continue to fail.
Pluralism is currently the majority view of the philosophers of science -- that the other fields of science are not and never will be reducible to physics. See the final section of the SEP entry: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-reduction/
There is theory behind pluralism -- that when the key concepts and features of a field are simply disconnected from the lower level science field, then they will never be reducible to it. For instance, cells are not reducible to molecules or atoms -- molecules change radically over time in cells, and atoms drift in and out of them -- a molecular or atomic reductionism simply cannot ever work, because it focuses on the wrong (and irrelevant) questions. An atomic focus simply cannot be relevant to cellular function, cellular health, etc.
It might just be unfinished work.
Consider this passage in the SEP:
"Consider classical mechanics first. The observables are functions on phase space, functions of the positions and momenta of the particles. The axioms governing the behavior of the basic observables—Newton’s equations for the positions or Hamilton’s for positions and momenta—define the theory. What would be the point of making additional axioms, for other observables? After all, the behavior of the basic observables entirely determines the behavior of any observable. For example, for classical mechanics, the principle of the conservation of energy is a theorem, not an axiom" https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-bohm/
It is saying that empirical observations are made through observations of physical quantities - observables. And just two observables, position and momentum, entirely determine the behavior of every other observable when taken along with some basic axioms governing the two basic observables (e.g. Newton's or Hamilton's laws).
We don't need any extra rules to tell us what will be observable/possible. That's the beauty. We can add extra theorems like the conservation of energy, to simplify things for us, but they are not adding additional necessary info.
To take the above to its logical conclusion, we simply have not developed intermediate theorems between observables from other sciences and the base observables of position and momentum. The logical conclusion in this line of thinking is that some theorem or theorems exist uniting the two layers, we just haven't been smart enough or had enough time to develop them.
There is probably a more concise term for this frame of view.
The position that the laws of one branch of science can be deduced from another branch is called reductionism.* The two simplest counter-arguments are the Many-One Argument and the One-Many Argument.
This is the argument that many 'fundamental' phenomena corresponds to one 'derived' phenomena. An example is albinism. There are 4 types of albinism conveniently named type 1, type 2, type 3, and type 4. Type 2 and 4 have the same symptoms even though they caused by different genes (OCA2 and SLC45A2, respectfully).
This is the argument that one 'fundamental' phenomena corresponds to multiple 'derived' phenomena. An example is exons, introns, and alternative splicing.
A single gene can contain numerous exons and introns, and the exons can be spliced together in different ways. For example, if a gene contains 10 exons, one version of the mRNA transcribed from that gene might contain exons 1-9. Another version of the mRNA might contain exons 1-8, and exon 10. This is called alternative splicing, and can produce different forms of a protein from the same gene. The different forms of the mRNA are called transcript variants, splice variants, or isoforms.
*Be careful looking into this. Scientific reductionism is an extremely different topic than reductionism in science