In Five Proofs of the Existence of God, Edward Feser mentions the principle of proportionate causality:
whatever is in some effect must in some way or other be in the cause, even if not always in the same way. For a cause cannot give what it does not have to give
Then he defines the ways in which what in the effect might be in the cause by some examples:
Suppose, for example, that I give you $20. The effect in this case is your having the $20, and I am the cause of this effect. But the only way I can cause that effect is if I have the $20 to give you in the first place. Now there are several ways in which I might have it. I might have a $20 bill in my wallet, or two $10 bills, or four $5 bills. Or I may have no money in my wallet, but do have $20 in my bank account and write you a check. Or I may not have even that, but I am able to borrow the $20 from someone else, or work for it, so that I can go on to give it to you. Or perhaps I have a friend who has a key to the U.S. Treasury printing press and I get him to run off an official $20 bill for me to give to you. Or to take an even more farfetched scenario, suppose that in order to guarantee that you get that $20 I somehow convince Congress to pass a law which permits me personally to manufacture my own $20 bills. These are all various ways in which I might in theory give you $20. But if none of these ways are available to me, then I can’t do it. Again, these are different ways in which the cause may have what is in the effect. When I myself have a $20 bill ready to hand and I cause you to have it, what is in the effect was in the cause formally, to use some traditional jargon. That is to say, I myself was an instance of the form or pattern of having a $20 bill, and I caused you to become another instance of that form or pattern. When I don’t have the $20 bill ready to hand but I do have at least $20 credit in my bank account, you might say that what was in the effect was in that case in the cause virtually. For though I didn’t actually have the $20 on hand, I did have the power to get hold of it. And when I get Congress to grant me the power to manufacture $20 bills, you might say (once again to use some traditional jargon) that I had the $20 eminently. Because in that case, I not only have the power to acquire already- existing $20 bills, but the more “eminent” power of causing them to exist in the first place. When it is said, then, that what is in an effect must in some way be in its cause, what is meant is that it must be in the cause at least “virtually” or “eminently” even if not “formally”.
And then proves the first cause of all things who causes them to exist at any moment has intelligence.
the effects (everything) must exist in the cause in something like the way thoughts exist in us. So, what exists in the things that the purely actual cause is the cause of preexists in that cause in something like the way the things we make preexist as ideas or plans in our minds before we make them. These things thereby exist in that purely actual cause eminently and virtually even if not formally.
Now let's say that two colors (red and yellow) were mixed to give us a new color (orange). In this case, the cause of the new color (the effect) is the mixed two colors (the cause). The two colors didn't have what's in the effect formally (they weren't an instance of the new color) nor virtually (as it wasn't somewhere and the two colors got hold of it), so the cause, in this case, had what's in the effect eminently (the two colors caused the new one to exist). Looking at this example, although the two mixed colors had what's in the effect eminently, they weren't intelligent; they didn't have the new color in a way like we have things in our thoughts! Now you might say that the cause wasn't the two colors but rather the one who mixed them, but for the sake of this question, the colors got mixed by no intelligent agent.
It seems Feser's proof of the intelligence of the first cause of all things is flawed. How can "eminent" necessarily imply "intelligent"?