Analytic philosophy, although not without its faults, has made some real progress in moving us beyond traditional metaphysics. Nobody really believes, for example, in Platonic forms any more.

On the other hand, phenomenology, or the phenomenological method, seems not to have produced anything useful at all... just a lot of jargon-laden hand-waving about vague generalities like subjectivity, etc. etc. The idea of intuiting essences by introspecting really hard just doesn't cut it.

Or am I wrong?

Has phenomenology produced ANY useful philosophical advances?

  • Phenomenology are most used in psychology, sociology, nursing, economics, etc areas by now, while analytic philosophy contribute lot to mathematical logic and foundations and more hard science areas by its positivists tradition. Both contributed to philosophy of language and mind in different ways, postmodern deconstruction uses some phenomenology from both Husserl's epoche and Heidegger's hermeneutic schools. May 13 at 2:56
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    This is a good question I would like to know the answer to as well. A genuine philosophical advance is a high bar to clear and if phenomenology has truly led to one, I'd love to hear it! Don't tell me how this school influenced that school or whatever. Give me a concrete advance in knowledge; a valuable and true proposition that came out of phenomenology.
    – causative
    May 13 at 4:20
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    @causative "Moving us beyond traditional metaphysics" does not strike me as a "concrete advance in knowledge" or a "valuable and true proposition" by any kind of neutral criterion. And knowledge and true propositions do not exhaust the ends of human culture that philosophy services as a whole, even positivists left room for "expression of an attitude toward life". Roughly, phenomenology played the same role in methodology of humanities as analytic philosophy in methodology of (harder) sciences, see also influence on AI research.
    – Conifold
    May 13 at 8:34
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    Also see enactivism in cognitive science and AI, found a paper here which connects it to phenomenology. Incidentally, it is not true that in analytic philosophy "Nobody really believes, for example, in Platonic forms any more", not if you include purely mathematical platonism--for various prominent analytic philosophers who have argued for accepting mathematical objects in our ontology, see the SEP article on Indispensability Arguments in phil. of math.
    – Hypnosifl
    May 13 at 18:08
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    @Hypnosifl Causally inert abstract objects of analytic philosophers are not really Plato's forms, which where the ultimate causes of reality. There are some (few) who endorse "real universals", which would be closer, but not in the context of mathematical platonism.
    – Conifold
    May 13 at 23:27

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