Question: is the T-schema generally regarded among philosophers as the same as Convention-T?
My understanding of Convention-T (and material adequacy) is as follows.
Consider the sentence ‘Schnee ist weiß’. Our intuition tells us that this sentence is true iff snow really is white. Material adequacy requires the definition (of what it takes for this sentence to be true) to conform to this intuition, and Tarski’s way to satisfy this is with Convention-T, an instance would be like this: ‘Schnee ist weiß’ is true iff snow is white. Clearly, there are infinitely many true sentences in L, thus this convention has infinitely many instances and take the general form: True(s) iff p, where s is the name of a sentence in L formed by adding quotation marks around it (e.g. ‘Schnee ist weiß’), p is a translation of s in M (e.g. snow is white), and True() is the truth predicate.
And I understand the T-schema to be an inductive definition of truth.
If P: Schnee ist weiß, then snow is white iff 'Schnee ist weiß' is true, i.e. P ⟷ True("P").
Inductively we can go onto define truth for more complicated sentences, e.g. P∧Q⟷ True("P") and True("Q").
But then it would seem that the T-schema just is Convention-T.
In the SEP, T-schema and Convention-T are regarded as the same:
Tarski gives a number of conditions that, as he puts it, any adequate definition of truth must satisfy. The central of these conditions is what is now most often referred to as Schema T (or the T-schema or Convention T or the Tarski biconditionals) - https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/#ConSemPar
But at the same time, it seems that Putnam disagrees:
In his paper "Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity" published recently in the Journal of the American Philosophical Association, the late Hilary Putnam does an admirable job of disentangling Tarski's Convention-T from Tarski's T-Schema. For too long, orthodox interpretations of Tarski's theory of truth have accepted that Convention-T and the material adequacy condition are the same, indistinguishable from one another. Putnam seems to suggest an alternative to the orthodox interpretation that captures the distinction between the formal semantic theory of truth that Tarski went to great lengths to uncover in his work and the ordinary non-technical notion of truth he left aside because it was too ambiguous for us to make any headway. - https://www.josephulatowski.net/post/2018/01/06/convention-t-and-the-t-schema
So it would seem that there are those who think that the T-schema and Convention-T are not the same. But is this a general consensus among philosophers?