Confirmation in light of your posited evidence e of a hypothesis H of a particular scientific theory to support Baconian inductive inference is attacked heavily in modern philosophy of science such as the epistemology proposed by Quine's confirmation holism:
In philosophy of science, confirmation holism, also called epistemological holism, is the view that no individual statement can be confirmed or disconfirmed by an empirical test, but rather that only a set of statements (a whole theory) can be so. Van Orman Quine who motivated his holism through extending Pierre Duhem's problem of underdetermination in physical theory to all knowledge claims... Duhem's idea was, roughly, that no theory of any type can be tested in isolation but only when embedded in a background of other hypotheses, e.g. hypotheses about initial conditions. Quine thought that this background involved not only such hypotheses but also our whole web of belief, which, among other things, includes our mathematical and logical theories and our scientific theories. This last claim is sometimes known as the Duhem–Quine thesis.
So it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation, because an empirical test of the hypothesis requires one or more background assumptions. If there's no background hypotheses, pretty much everything like a blue cup can confirm the hypothesis "All ravens are black" since this propositional hypothesis is logically equivalent as "If something is not black, then it is not a raven", which sounds ridiculous but actually true conforming with Bayes theorem if we don't know there're much more non-ravan objects than the number of ravens. Even one insists only observations of ravens should affect one's view as to whether all ravens are black such as the positive Nicod's criterion, I. J. Good gives an example of background knowledge with respect to which the observation of a black raven actually decreases the probability that all ravens are black:
Suppose that we know we are in one or other of two worlds, and the hypothesis, H, under consideration is that all the ravens in our world are black. We know in advance that in one world there are a hundred black ravens, no non-black ravens, and a million other birds; and that in the other world there are a thousand black ravens, one white raven, and a million other birds. A bird is selected equiprobably at random from all the birds in our world. It turns out to be a black raven. This is strong evidence ... that we are in the second world, wherein not all ravens are black... Hempel insists our background knowledge itself is a red herring, and that we should consider induction with respect to a condition of perfect ignorance.
So even you empirically confirms a hypothesis, you cannot claim such confirmation is strong enough or even relevant at all to inductively infer hypothesis H in most cases without clarification about all your other web of beliefs including other assumptions, hypotheses and knowledges.
As referenced here:
In 1936, Carnap sought a switch from verification to confirmation. Carnap's confirmationism would not require conclusive verification (thus accommodating for universal generalizations) but allow for partial testability to establish "degrees of confirmation" on a probabilistic basis. Carnap never succeeded in formalizing his thesis despite employing abundant logical and mathematical tools for this purpose... Karl Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery proposed falsificationism as a criterion under which scientific hypothesis would be tenable. Falsificationism would allow hypotheses expressed as universal generalizations, such as "all swans are white", to be provisionally true until falsified by evidence, in contrast to verificationism under which they would be disqualified immediately as meaningless... Though generally considered a revision of verificationism, Popper intended falsificationism as a methodological standard specific to the sciences rather than as a theory of meaning. Popper regarded scientific hypotheses to be unverifiable, as well as not "confirmable" under Rudolf Carnap's thesis.
In summary, inductive inference doesn't entail or imply the cogency of a naive confirmation of a standalone hypothesis intending as a causal mechanism of a theory. This conclusion can also be hinted from Hume's famous problem of induction as inductive inference itself is not causal but mere constant conjunction, hardly can be used as a logic foundation for any scientific theory trying to explain causality like Einstein's GR, no matter how many valid confirmations are established about the hypotheses of classic Galilean relativity and flat space, these hypotheses both turned out to be false and mere illusions which only act as convenient approximate beliefs under applicable classic contexts instead of true ontic causality of mechanics.