Teleporting persons and multiple "you's" are discussed in serious thought experiments in physics and philosophy.
I feel like most of the time these scenarios come up, I would not make the same assumptions I feel the experimenters do however. The problem is, most of the time they never explain their assumptions that allow them to make the claims they do.
When I think of the self, I can't picture how it can be teleported along with the rest of the body. This is due to how I picture the duplicator version of the thought experiment. In the duplicator, nothing happens to your original body. Instead of being decomposed and beamed then recomposed, your original body remains unaffected, and a duplicate is beamed instead. There are now two materially identical versions of you, each with their own conscious experiences. When the consciousness of the version of me on Mars feels pain, my consciousness on Earth does not. And vice versa.
Thus I would never take a transporter because I believe your self must die every time. If it did not die, I can't explain the duplicator version.
But then I hear other serious philosophers and physicists think no, you would wake up on Mars. Or in quantum immortality, you will live forever, instead of saying a version of something that branched from you lives forever.
So A) is my version of the self incompatible with quantum immortality and being able to say I woke up on Mars, and B) is this the minority opinion of the self within philosophy? How else can I explain serious philosophers and physicists not listing their assumptions when they talk about transporters and quantum immortality. Where can I go that discusses this within the example of teleporters and quantum immortality?