Seems like no one brought up Frankfurt and hierarchical compatabilism.
First-order desires: Desires that are directed on objects or states of affiarrs. We desire things like being healthy, well informed, and being paid
Second-order desires: Self-conscious beings are not only aware of the first-order desire, but can have desires about those desires. A smoker can have the desire to not desire to smoke.
Second-order volitions: Second-order desires we want to act on. There are second-order desires we don't wish to act on, like a priest desiring to know what it's like to be married.
To act freely, says Frankfurt, is to act on a second-order volition. If you do not formulate second-order volitions, or do not act on the ones you do form, your actions are not free-you are a slave to your first order desires.
According to Frankfurt, free actions are caused by second-order volitions that one decisively identifies with. "Decisively identifies with" is need to forestall an infinite regress. We may formulate a third-order desire and so on. But a second-order desire that we decisively identify with, claims Frankfurt, "resounds" throughout the potentially endless array of higher orders, halts the regress, and brings coherence to our preference structure.
Note that traditional compatabilism maintains that you cannot act freely if your actions are externally constrained. Frankfurt denies this. As long as you act on your second-order volitions, you are responsible for you actions, whether or not you could do otherwise.
From Doing Philosophy 4th ed. Theodore Shick Jr, Lewis Vaugh 2010 pp. 220-225