Presumably, everything exists and is equal to itself. For purposes of this question, I call existence and equality-to-self logical properties, but this is intended as terminology not metaphysics. In fact, my whole question is intended to be metaphysics-free. We can ignore the objects of fiction, but other than that, I'm talking about any class X such that "There are some X's that ..." is a true English sentence. For example:
- There are some thoughts that are more edifying than others
- There are some numbers that are odd.
- There are some minds that are more aware than others.
- There are some moral principles that are not universally believed.
- There are some cars that are faster than others.
Given that this is what I mean by "everything", are there any other sorts of properties or relations that can be coherently applied to everything? For example, it isn't coherent to say that a thought is pink or that a car is about something or that a number was yesterday.
I'm just curious whether anyone has identified a class of non-logical predicates (or even a single non-logical predicate) that can be coherently applied to everything.
In response to the comments and answers, let me add the following: I'm aware that there are formalistic solutions such as stipulating that if it doesn't make sense to apply a property to a certain individual, then you define the property as false for that individual; however, this move abstracts away the very notion of a property, so it's not an interesting solution.
Similarly, by "logical property" I mean a fully abstract or formal property, that applies just in virtue of thingness. I would include here mathematical properties and abstract relationships such as mereological relationships. For example, one might suggest that everything is such that it can be a part, but if this is true, it is only true abstractly, because "part" is being used for different relationships in different domains. A subset is not a part of its set in the same way that a wheel is part of a car.
Also, it is not the case that different categories of thing necessarily have different properties. For example, minds and bodies are two different categories, but they are both temporal entities. Thoughts and numbers are two different categories, but they are both present only to minds. It was considerations of this sort that made me wonder if there are any properties that are shared more widely by all or at least most categories of things.