I found two essays on a kind of response to the Gettier problem. One is a Philosophy Now article, and another is a blog post. On both sources, they argue that Smith's belief (on the original Gettier example) that "The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket," (or belief b) refers not just to any man who might get the job, but only to Jones. In the Philosophy Now article, the author claims that belief b is false because Jones is not the one who gets the job. In the blog post, the author has considered Donnellan's argument such that even though the description found in belief b, "The man who will get the job," is not accurate of Jones, Smith can still use it to successfully refer to Jones. As per Donnellan, although the definite description denotes (Smith, who has ten coins), people refer (to Jones, who has ten coins), however inaccurate their description is.
Either way, the general idea is that the belief found in a Gettier example isn't as it seems. The proposition in the belief (the belief that P) is actually distinct from the proposition in the knowledge (the knowledge that
P Q) that the example tries to show to be absent. Are there any scholarly works that pursue and critique this kind of idea?