Can my moral obligations conflict with yours?

Question

Can my moral obligations conflict with yours? It is well known that if they are absolute my own obligations cannot conflict.

Stuart Hampshire joins this group claiming "there must always be moral conflicts which cannot, given the nature of morality, be resolved by any constant and generally acknowledged method of reasoning."4 Apparently concerned to forestall a likely objection, he hastens to add that he is "not arguing for moral relativism"... Many have agreed with Fred Feldman that "absolutism is the view that there is one criterion of morality valid for all people at all times, . . . it is the view that there is a single ultimate moral standard."'9 This is a strong statement, yet it captures the sort of absolutism associated with Kant and the utilitarians which Hampshire rejects. Consequently, if this is what is meant by ethical absolutism, and if by denying absolutism one is defending ethical relativism, then it seems clear that Hampshire is defending relativism of some sort, despite his claims to the contrary.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/2381890?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

So, supposing I do not give myself permission for an event, does that mean I do not give you permission to bring that event about?

Independent of whether or not you know I do.

I would like to know of any ethics in which I can oblige myself not to bring something about, but not you.

Answer 1

Any moral obligation is a conviction: something that one has become convinced of. The nature of a conviction is that it must be passed from person to person. One must first be convinced, and once convinced one will naturally wish to convince others for their own benefit. If the moral obligations of Person A conflict with the moral obligations of Person B, then A and B will naturally attempt to convince each other, in an effort to gain a common worldview.

'Give permission' is an odd turn of phrase. Why does Person B need permission from Person A (or vice-versa) to take actions and bring about events? This invokes an unspoken power structure that ought to be specified. But generally speaking, forcing someone to comply with one's own moral obligations is a different practice from inculcating the conviction to comply within them. In other words, if Person A convinces Person B to comply with a moral obligation, all is well and good (ethically speaking). But if Person A forces Person B to comply with a moral obligation (against B's will), then A has failed in the sociological/soteriological task of passing on the conviction, which raise a number of ethical issues.

Answer 2

It is indeed the case that the literature on moral dilemmas claims that, if there are irresolvable conflicts in morality for an individual moral agent, then "absolute morality" does not cover them.

Stuart Hampshire joins this group claiming "there must always be moral conflicts which cannot, given the nature of morality, be resolved by any constant and generally acknowledged method of reasoning."4 Apparently concerned to forestall a likely objection, he hastens to add that he is "not arguing for moral relativism"... Many have agreed with Fred Feldman that "absolutism is the view that there is one criterion of morality valid for all people at all times, . . . it is the view that there is a single ultimate moral standard."'9 This is a strong statement, yet it captures the sort of absolutism associated with Kant and the utilitarians which Hampshire rejects. Consequently, if this is what is meant by ethical absolutism, and if by denying absolutism one is defending ethical relativism, then it seems clear that Hampshire is defending relativism of some sort, despite his claims to the contrary.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/2381890?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

Is what is the case for individual moral agents (I am obliged to pull the lever) binding for all moral agents (I should permit you to pull the lever)? This is going to be more moot: just because a moral prescription holds for everyone may not mean that moral agents can never conflict. That's the nature of the beast.

In e.g. Kant, who believes in property rights, my right - and your corresponding duty - to enjoy my property is not shared in by you. However, if every right entails an absolute duty from everyone else, then as my duty (to pull the lever) is also my right, so you have a duty to allow.

TL;DR

Not if my everyone has a duty corresponding to my every one of my rights.

Answer 3

Can my moral obligations conflict with yours?

In short, yes.

Now, there are various ways to approach this.

The first explanation is the logical positivist claim that moral claims have no propositional value, so we only ever express some preference or emotional state. On this account the problem is sorted, yes, you can disagree, but you are neither ever right nor wrong.

If we believe that moral claims are truth-functional, then the situation is different.

Namely, if a moral obligation contradicts one another logically, then it implies that they cannot be both true at the same time:

• It is right to steal, so I steal.
• It is wrong to steal, so I don't steal.

Therefore, if "moral claims do contradict each other" is an absolute statement, then it implies moral relativism in "all moral claims are false". If not, then it means that "some moral claims are false", so there is at least one moral claim which is objectively true (right).

If one thinks the former claim, that moral relativism is true, then one cannot rationally believe any moral judgement. It is because, in order to rationally believe anything, the proposition must first be justified or supported. Any such moral relativist starts from the position that no moral proposition is true before he/she believes it, so he/she has no justification for accepting it*.

The latter claim is simply moral realism; that there are objectively existent values and moral claims that we simply discover via reason.

I would like to know of any ethics in which I can oblige myself not to bring something about, but not you.

For example, Emotivism.

*- I personally believe that this position is quite hilarious, namely to believe in something that one already knows to be false.

Answer 4

Modulo some specific assumptions, you can resolve this question pretty easily. Now in philosophy, we never just specify our assumptions, but we go on to question those, and so on. Even so, here's the resolution:

1. Person A ought to B.
2. Person C ought to D.
3. Ought-implies-can [this is the specific assumption that does the job*].
4. Therefore, if persons A and C ought to do B and D, then it is possible for B and D to both be done.
5. If B and D conflict, they can't both be done.
6. Therefore, B and D don't conflict. QED

*_{Well, to be extra-technical, I think you might also need to specify having interpersonal agglomeration in place.}