Can my moral obligations conflict with yours? It is well known that if they are absolute my own obligations cannot conflict.
Stuart Hampshire joins this group claiming "there must always be moral conflicts which cannot, given the nature of morality, be resolved by any constant and generally acknowledged method of reasoning."4 Apparently concerned to forestall a likely objection, he hastens to add that he is "not arguing for moral relativism"... Many have agreed with Fred Feldman that "absolutism is the view that there is one criterion of morality valid for all people at all times, . . . it is the view that there is a single ultimate moral standard."'9 This is a strong statement, yet it captures the sort of absolutism associated with Kant and the utilitarians which Hampshire rejects. Consequently, if this is what is meant by ethical absolutism, and if by denying absolutism one is defending ethical relativism, then it seems clear that Hampshire is defending relativism of some sort, despite his claims to the contrary.
So, supposing I do not give myself permission for an event, does that mean I do not give you permission to bring that event about?
Independent of whether or not you know I do.
I would like to know of any ethics in which I can oblige myself not to bring something about, but not you.