Consequentialism seems to justify punishment to maximize total utility. What about deontology, virtue ethics, etc? Can they justify punishment? And how would that work in the absence of free will?
To read the full article, you'd need JSTOR access. But if you search "deontology without free will" (on Google), you get a quote from the article's interior:
... there are also varieties of deontology and virtue ethics that do not require appeals to free will. It is probably obvious that utilitarians need not appeal ...
I assume that the latter ellipsis covers something like "to free will, either."
From a Rawlsian point of view, if theories of the existence/nonexistence of free will are too convoluted or controversial to undergird publicly accessible moral standards, then Rawlsian ethics doesn't require that one adopt a settled judgment on this score, either. (On the other hand, Rawls in A Theory of Justice says that the parties in the original position are equipped with knowledge of general psychological facts; I imagine that having free will would be an important psychological fact to know about! Moreover, since as he also says in AToJ that considered judgments/intuitions are admissible supports for our moral beliefs, then there is space for someone with the intuition that free will is required for morality, to otherwise then go on to be a Rawlsian, too.)
Moral theory depends on the concept of free will. To be a moral agent means to be able to choose between mutually exclusive actions, which cannot happen if one does not have at least constrained forms of free will.
This is as true of consequentialism as of any other moral theory, and I'm uncertain who would suggest otherwise. The entire point of consequentialism is that one ought to examine the potential consequences of one's owns actions and choose actions that that have good outcomes (or at least minimize the harm to others). If one cannot choose, then contemplating consequences is a futile exercise.