The short answer is yes. By asking 'a thing or an action' you are asking a question which immediately implies a dualism. The Dao is non-dual. Any attempt at answering with a dualistic answer will immediately fail. David Loy in his book Nonduality: A Study in Comparative Philosophy states in Chapter 3, Nondual Action:
Such nondual action requires that there be no differentiation between agent and act; in other words, no awareness of an agent as distinct from its actions. This chapter explores what that might mean. The first section argues that the Taoist paradox of wei-wu-wei (the action of inaction) is a description of such nondual action. It is highly significant that the same paradox is found in two other nondualistic traditions, clearly enunciated in the Bhagavad-gita and more fully developed in the Buddhist account of the Bodhisattva's path. Comparing these we discover that the difference between dualistic and nondualistic action involves intention. The mental process of intending a result from an action devalues that act into a means and functions as a superimposition that bifurcates the nondual "psychic body" into a mind inhabiting a body, "a ghost in a machine." The second section supports this by demonstrating that the bifurcating role of intentionality is one of the crucial claims of in the first chapter of of the Tao Te Ching; that chapter is explicated in detail.
Nondual action has just been defined as action in which there is no awareness by an agent, the subject that is usually believed to do the action, of being distinct from an objective action that is done. Chapter 2 gave us a occasion to notice that nondual experience tends to be described in one of two ways; wither the subject incorporates the object, or vice-versa. In the present case the first alternative amounts to denying any action is performed. It can hardly be coincidence that we find precisely this claim in the wei-wu-wei of Taoism. Weo-wu-wei is the central paradox of Taoism and as a concept is second in importance only to the Tao itself, which incorporates it...
and further on in the same chapter:
...for Nietzsche, intention and the will in general are epiphenomena and not the true cause of of an action.
Such a denial of volition (by no means uncommon) is usually understood to imply determinism, but the concept of nondual action suggests an alternative that escapes the usual dilemma of freedom versus determinism. The usual formulations of that problem are dualistic in presupposing a conscious subject whose actions either are completely determined by a causal chain (the strongest causal influence reaps the effect) or are free from the causal chain (or rather free from complete determinination, since totally uncaused, random choice does not seem to provide freedom in any meaningful sense). Both alternatives assume the existence of a conscious self distinct from its actions and existent outside the causal chain, although its actions may be totally determined by external causes. But the nondualist claim that there is no self does not imply unimpeded determinism, for if there is no subject then there are also no "objective" causal factors. The deterministic view implies a self helpless before causal influences that struggle among themselves to see which is strongest, rather like medieval knights competing to see who will win the hapless lady; but if there no hapless consciousness here then the situation must be understood differently. Hobbes said that "liberty or freedom signifies properly the absence of opposition" and that captures our common-sense notion of freedom from. This means that the concept of freedom is dualistic in two senses. Free is dependent upon its opposite, becoming the negation of unfree, and moreover that opposite is dualistic in the sense that one thing constrains another. If there is no "other" to be opposed, as in nondualistic experience, such dualistic concepts do not apply. In later chapters I argue that the nondualistic denial of self (as in Buddhism) is equivalent to asserting that there is only the Self (as in Vedanta). We would normally infer that the former implies complete determinism, the latter absolute freedom. However, if the universe is a whole (Brahman, Tao, Vijnaprmatrata, etc.) and if, as Hua Yen Buddhism develops in its original image of Indra's Net, each particular is not isolated but contains the whole universe that acts--or rather, is the action. And if we accept that the universe is self-caused, then its acts freely whenever anything is done. Thus, from the nondualistic perspective, complete determinism turns out to be equivalent to absolute freedom.
In his book Taoism: The Road to Immortality, John Blofeld writes (page 3):
Lao-tzu tells us that 'Tao' is just a convenient term for what had best be called the Nameless. Nothing can be said of it that does not distract from its fullness. To say that it exists is to exclude what does not exist, although the void is the very nature of the Tao. To say that it does not exist is to exclude the Tao-permeated plenum. Away with dualistic categories. Words limit. The Tao is limitless. It is T'ai Hsu (the Great Void), free from characteristics, self-existent, undifferentiated, vast beyond conception, yet present in full in a tiny seed. It is also T'ai Chi (the Ultimate Cause, the Mainspring of the Cosmos). It is also T'ai I (the Great Changer), for its changes and convolutions never cease. Seen by man with his limited vision, it is also T'ien (heaven), the source of governance and orderliness. It is the Mother of Heaven and Earth, without whose nourishment nothing can exist.
The use of the word 'Void' does not imply what most Westerners think of as the word void usually implies in everyday parlance, rather it should be understood as That which is 'outside' of or 'beyond' the sensual universe.