Consider the first-order sentence
∃x (∀y (A(x,y) → B(x,y)) → ∃z C(z))
Let's write this sentence in prenex form.
First let's write one of the conditionals using the equivalence: a → b ⟺ ~a | b
∃x (~(∀y (A(x,y) → B(x,y))) | ∃z C(z))
Now we pass the negation through the universal quantifier using one of DeMorgan's Laws:
∃x (∃y ~(A(x,y) → B(x,y)) | ∃z C(z))
We can now pull the existential quantifiers to the beginning of the sentence because of null quantification:
∃x ∃y ∃z (~(A(x,y) → B(x,y)) | C(z))
Using the material conditional equivalence mentioned previously, we get:
∃x ∃y ∃z ((A(x,y) → B(x,y)) → C(z))
In summary, we started with
∃x (∀y (A(x,y) → B(x,y)) → ∃z C(z))
and arrived at
∃x ∃y ∃z ((A(x,y) → B(x,y)) → ∃z C(z))
Are these two sentences equivalent?
It seems really strange that we essentially replaced a universal quantifier with an existential one. We started with
"there is an x with the property that if it is the case that for all y, when A(x,y) then B(x,y), then there is a z with property C"
and that became
"there are x, y, z with the property that if it is the case that when A(x,y) then B(x,y), then there is a z with property C.
Just looking at it, this seems incorrect to me.
In the first case, if for every y, A(x,y) → B(x,y) is true, then ∃z such that C(z). If this is the case, then there exists some y such that A(x,y) → B(x,y), and also ∃z such that C(z) for that y. If it is false that for every y, A(x,y) → B(x,y), then the entire sentence is true. In this case, there could still be some y such that A(x,y) → B(x,y), and it could be the case that there is no z such that C(z) for that y, which would make the sentence false.
Are the two sentences really equivalent?