I would have trouble convincing myself that there was no strong sociohistorical dynamic connecting early Zoroastrianism and the more famous periods in the history of Greek philosophy, but I would also have trouble convincing myself that a non-negligible "quantity" of harmony between the two would not have obtained otherwise even so. I used to be "into" the idea of showing that the "natural"/"normal" "development of human reason" in this or that person (and/or then community) tends to lead towards convergence of opinion, at least with respect to a minimal answer to a simple form of moral relativism, say.
But by now, my opinion would be that this "natural development" is a tendency to lead to convergence of inquiry, i.e. people around the world in different periods of time ask questions with sufficiently clear counterparts in various regions/cultures/etc.
So what kinds of queries are posed in Zoroastrian scriptures and other traditions? I myself don't know, not having actually read the scriptures and only having an excited, but distracted, outsider's appreciation for the traditions. It is one thing to assert a theomorphic dualism of moral opposition, another to ask a question like, "How many divine beings are there, and why are any different from others, in case there are many of them?" One can also imagine that a Greek convert to Zoroastrianism in antiquity might have had occasion to think of arguing for various answers to those questions. This is not to say there are no such arguments in the original text; again, I don't know if there are. Anyway, we would be looking for something more abstract than an argument from the folk theory of testimonial evidence (in the form of trustworthy claims to being a prophet), which is a concrete method in religious apologetics. So instead, we might look for a line of reasoning such as, "The concept of what is important is itself more important than the concept of what is unimportant or even, Heaven and Hell forbid!, anti-important. Goodness is a kind of importance, and even though evil is important, the way it is important is more like anti-importance. Also, suppose that for all possible divine beings, it must be that their moral properties find immediate and overwhelming expression outside of them. So if there is a good divine being, this being will be intrinsically greater in nature than an evil divine being." Or whatever else along this line.
There are then going to be obvious divergences between famous Greek philosophers from antiquity, and the interplay of Zoroastrian (as Persian) culture and Greek culture. For example, Plato has an unclear number of "crucial" divine entities in his system: the Form of the Good, the demiurge, and the world-soul. Regardless of how these terms were supposed to be related, it does seem as if any of them was supposed to refer to something good, and especially with respect to the "power level" Plato attributes to auto to agathon ("greater in dignity and might" than all the other Forms, even such as that of Knowledge), it seems that if Plato's ontology included an Ahriman of its own, it would not be as an entity as fundamental as Ahriman was, even modulo the Zurvanite model of Ahura Mazda and Ahriman's origins (IIRC).
And then there'd be Aristotle. Or Socrates himself, for that matter. As far as I understand it, Zoroastrianism isn't a case of divine-command theory/theological voluntarism, even if Ahura Mazda/Spenta Mainyu are ultimate exemplars of goodness. Because they are exemplars, to that extent they "refer back to" a more abstract goodness, or at worst/best we might coidentify the abstract goodness with some property of Ahura Mazda more concretely as such. I don't know how far into the divine-simplicity debate Zoroastrianism has ever gotten, even respecting what Zurvan was supposed to be. At any rate, though, Zoroastrianism isn't polytheistic enough to occasion Socrates' question about moral piety: clearly it is not enough that a divine being commends something, in order for it to be morally pious to do that thing, else anything Ahriman commended it would be morally pious to do! Accordingly, "conflict between the gods" in Zoroastrianism just emphasizes the evil of the evil god; it does not generate a quandary over what to do when your whole magisterial pantheon is at odds with each other.