My answer will represent views such as those by Daniel Dennett, who is maybe the most prominent author on compatibilism, the view that determinism is compatible with knowledge, wisdom, will, consciousness, imagination and intelligence.
Note there is also Incompatibilism, the view that with determinism, knowledge and free will and such are impossible, but I assume the question is about compatibilism.
The question tries to disprove compatibilism based on simple fixed definitions, to then disprove determinism. If it was that simple, philosophers would not still be pondering this after several centuries of debate.
We can however quickly show the flaw in the argument. Let's say for the sake of the argument self-driving cars act purely on data. No information, no knowledge. Self-driving cars are very possible in a deterministic world.
But now there is the conflict: if in determinism only past events determine future events, how can data influence the direction of a driving car? That's the same argument as in the question, just replacing "knowledge" with data.
Compatibilism is the view that data, information, knowledge and wisdom are all possible as states in a deterministic world, Incompatibilism is the view that some or all of those are special and cannot exist in a deterministic world. Neither is right or wrong philosophically, as the definitions are not clear or specific enough to derive objective truth, definitions and viable assumptions can be found to either support compatibilism or incompatibilism.
That's why the debate continues even after centuries of the same arguments.
The compatibilist definition of "knowledge" is usually phrased to allow for certain artificial intelligence systems to possess knowledge as acting agents, a notion commonly rejected by incompatibilists.
In any case compatibilism implies that every thought and idea we have as humans is determined by prior events, and that we don't notice any restriction of freedom despite being entirely determined because we observe our actions logically following our thoughts.
The advances in computer science, data processing and artificial intelligence are gradually strengthening theoretic compatibilism, the view that even if the universe was indetermined, deterministic things like computers can reasonably be attributed free will, and thus the human brain could also be deterministic without losing free will.
The gradual disappearance of religious superstition from philosophy reduces the strength of libertarian incompatibilist arguments such as the one in the question.