Literature on this kind of thing is extremely hard to find. Nevertheless, my intuition here is that this argument gets into the territory of comparing existence and non-existence in a way that the other arguments for anti-natalism don't. The other arguments for anti-natalism (the asymmetry of pleasure/suffering and no pleasure/suffering, or a more simple utilitarian argument about the observed suffering present in most human lives) generally ignore the potential person in question in a specific way unique to this sort of consequentialist calculation. What they do instead is posit that the suffering or pleasure in question as desirable or undesirable regardless of the existence or desires of the potential person in question - that is, the suffering or pleasure of the potential person is what is moral or immoral, and that potential pleasure or suffering is only dependent on the potential person, not the actual person.
However, the consent argument gets into some incredibly finicky territory when it comes to the potential person in question. Consent ethics generally wants the agent to find consent on the part of the recipient of whatever they're going to do. However, what happens when the person in question doesn't exist? The arguments you shared seem to think that, because you can't determine consent, you can't act. There's more to things though, because to even talk about consent you need to have a consent-er in mind, and no such person exists in this scenario. That's not to say that the consent antinatalist argument is wrong, but this is where I see the main assumptions that it makes (whether consent is applicable to the abstract idea of a non-person). It seems to me that comparing the ethics surrounding existing persons and the ethics surrounding currently non-existent but potentially existent persons is never going to work, because the two things can't even be spoken coherently about in the same way!
Just some thoughts; I hope this helps. Googling "antinatalism" or "arguments against antinatalism" might work, and you can add "consent" to those searches to further refine them.
This is a good and thorough article, although it doesn't address the consent argument it gives good background for the topic.
Here's a decent conversation on r/Askphilosophy, which is generally a reputable and quality source for casual questions like these, though unofficial and informal. One comment provides a similar response to mine:
Consent-based version. I find this version stronger because it doesn't rely on empirical premises at all. It basically argues that if there is any suffering at all in life (which obviously there is), then it is immoral to inflict this suffering on a person without there consent. Since all unborn children cannot give consent, all procreation is a violation of consent and hence immoral.
This version of anti-natalism is, in my opinion, more difficult to
rebut, partly because consent based ethics are currently quite 'in
vogue' in academic moral philosophy (at least in my corner of the
woods). I don't have a response worked out, but my intuition is that
the strongest one is to interrogate the basis of consent in a way that
calls into question whether or not consent is really applicable to
highly abstract non-persons (like unconvinced children, which have
only a kind of potential existence). If it isn't (as I suspect), then
the consent based argument falls apart. I do think this part of the
debate is complex, though. Most people probably don't think we should
evaluate obligations to unconceived children in the same way as we
should to actual persons, but most people probably do nonetheless
think we have some obligations to unconceived children (e.g. to only
conceive them if we can provide a basic level of material security).
It's hard to mark out clear territory within these two intuitions, and
so hard to determine what we ought to think of consent-based