There is a claim that dysfunctional objects no longer belong to a specific category. For instance: eyes are pairs of globular organs of sight. An eye is an object that sees. An eye that ceases to be able to see and perform the function it serves is a dysfunctional eye and therefore not an eye. Is there an opposite philosophical position in which a dysfunctional e.g. eye is an e.g. eye? In which dysfunctions and disorders do not affect an identity and a dysfunctional [insert category] still belongs to [insert category] despite not satisfying the requirements for what it means to be [insert category] due to dysfunctions? ...

  • Definitions can intensional or extensional. in both cases, dysfunctional eyes can still be regarded as eyes, philosophy does not prevent this. Intensional definitions are more vulnerable to changes, but are more precise and helpful in formal reasoning, extensional definitions are more flexible and better suited for every-day reasoning.
    – tkruse
    Apr 25, 2022 at 8:52

1 Answer 1


A spark plug that doesn't work is still a spark plug, but it has a modified definition: it is now a broken spark plug.

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