In Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Kant argues that space (and time) are not qualities of objects, but a priori intuitions that allow the concepts of objects in our minds.
To argue in favor of this idea, he writes that
those who cannot yet get free of the conception, as if space and time were actual qualities attaching to things in themselves, can exercise their acuity on the following paradox
This paradox is exemplified with
two spherical triangles from each of the hemispheres, which have an arc of the equator for a common base, can be fully equal with respect to their sides as well as their angles, so that nothing will be found in either, when it is fully described by itself, that is not also in the description of the other
What I don't understand is, why the "hemisphere", or alternatively the coordinates of the point that does not touch the equator, is not considered as one of the qualities of the object, just as the common base and their sides were. How would Kant explain this?