This is presumably an extremely basic question, but I didn't have any luck on my preliminary attempts to Google an answer or track one down here.
After hearing a number of debates and presentations in which something called "modal arguments" were referenced, I decided to look into modal logic by following this tutorial series. The author gives the following definitions:
- A proposition p is necessary if it is not possible that not p (□p/~◊~p)
- In what he stated was a loose definition, the author said that "for every way that things can be different, there is a corresponding possible world."
- Combining necessity with the possible worlds notion, we interpret □p to be "true" in some world w if and only if p is true in all worlds that are accessible from w.
This definition of necessity with respect to possible worlds makes sense in most cases. However, I'm still confused on an edge case (which may be impossible, but I'm not sure):
- What happens when p is false in "w" but true in all of the possible worlds it accesses?
- Also, along the same vein, is a world accessible from itself?
I figure that if a world is accessible from itself, then the problem is resolved, which is why I ask (2). If a world is not accessible from itself, though, I figure that this problem is impossible from the perspective of nomological possibility, but can't figure out a way to resolve it if we consider logical possibility.