The boundary between general and particular information is not a sharp dichotomy; even if not sorites-theoretically vague, it still occupies a range. I'll quote Kant on the topic first (this is from his assessment of something he calls "amphiboly"):
It is right to say whatever is affirmed or denied of the whole of a conception can be affirmed or denied of any part of it (dictum de omni et nullo); but it would be absurd so to alter this logical proposition as to say whatever is not contained in a general conception is likewise not contained in the particular conceptions which rank under it; for the latter are particular conceptions, for the very reason that their content is greater than that which is cogitated in the general conception.
In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant's definition of intuition as delivering particular information, rather than information in the form of discursive general marks, yet allows for (A) forms of intuition (generalizations over intuition) and (B) formal intuitions (particulars, that we cognize an sich no less (Kant does say that we know space and time in themselves, though this is not entirely of a piece with his discourse on the question of an sich knowledge in general(!)).
Now, numbers make individuation possible, so to say; there is one cat on the mat, there are two zebras on the yacht, there are 10666 demons in the throne room, etc. I wasn't aware of it until SE user Mozibur Ullah spoke of it in one of his posts, but Plato did not put Numbers on quite the same level as Forms (or: there at least was a major phase of Plato's thought in which these levels diverged). So consider the following sequence:
- A = A
- A + B = B + A
- 2 + 3 = 3 + 2
- 10/5 + 27/9 = √9 + 210
(1) is more general than (2), etc., and we could go well beyond (4), particularizing the information further and further.
So for all that, it is not, "Are numbers (or Numbers) particular or general?" so much as, "How particular or general, are numbers?" Now, if there's a number(!) measuring "full particularity," well... (Note also that some numbers might be styled more particular or general than others, e.g. the number 1 might be seen as a very general number, figuring elementally in all positive integers, and inversely in all negative ones; or maybe transfinite numbers can be construed, vs. their closure conditions, as Forms of their closed-off elements, notwithstanding that they (the levels of infinity) are also particular in their own way, on top of representing all the possible particularization measured by their elements.)