Your statement is basically a variation of Eugene Wigner's seeking to explain 'The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences'.
I argue here that conservation laws in physics arise from symmetries (Noether's theorem), and that number lines are an abstraction of translational symmetries: The Unreasonable Ineffectiveness of Mathematics in most sciences By this similarity in form, maths is very powerful for physics. But biology, takes a lot more words, a lot more conceptual units. Causality in biology needs to be understood in a different way, because it is not generally directly grounded in conservation laws. We form heuristic explanatory layers, which supervene over physics with causes in the terms of their layer, but are reducible to physics in principle: Is the idea of a causal chain physical (or even scientific)?
The layer of intentions and identity, is a far more effective tractable way of predicting a human's behaviour, than knowing the position and momentum of their particles.
Language and the sharing of abstractions, also relates to a symmetry: inviting others into our subjectivity, and mentally travelling into theirs. This is intersubjectivity, and following the Private Language argument, it's a critical groundwork to beginning to systemise abstractions: According to the major theories of concepts, where do meanings come from? Language forms 'salience landscapes', overlays which we project on top of our experiences, that sort them into useful groupings, and foreground where and how we can act, in relation to achieving our goals. We can understand that as arising from narratives, that abstract 'the moral of the story', and causality as a form of narrative that aims to support it's story by direct observations, making the 'lessons' very transferable to other circumstances where what is modelled is known to be the same - Cartwright's 'How The Laws Of Physics Lie' goes in to how physics can only be as valid as our abstractions are sound, and we must not mistake physics for mathematics.
I argue Socrates was paradigmatic in defining philosophy. Plato was paradigmatic in defining academia, and to create his Academy he fused Socratic Dialogue, with the math-mysticism of Pythagoras, successfully combining disruptive thinkers into a workable 'cult'. Plato believed in a cosmos of planets defined by platonic solids, with associated 'music of the spheres'. Mathematical Platonism is still a popular stance, eg Tegmark, with people still getting misty-eyed imagine a 'more real' world of Forms, as embodied by mathematics. That's backwards though, maths is the systemising of abstractions, emergent from examining the world, and intersubjectivity. Don't fall for the math-cult propaganda.