I'm sure my terminology is poor here (background in math more than philosophy), but are there any philosophers who have advanced a distinctly non-relativist epistemology without ultimately coming out foundationalist? I'm not talking about coherentism or something like that; rather I'm wondering if any philosophers have argued that we may be able (incidentally, as it were) to know some things absolutely without claiming that any particular beliefs are axiomatically known to everyone?
For example, let's say that person A has a belief or set of beliefs which when understood in their entirety are self-evident (perhaps "I think therefore I am"). Rather than being merely coherent with person A's other beliefs, this conclusion is taken to be true in an absolute sense. However a person B (with respect to whose framework A's belief must also be considered true since it is an absolute) might be unable to rationally conclude that A's belief or set of beliefs is true, not only with respect to A ("A thinks, therefore A is") but even with respect to herself ("B thinks, therefore B is"). In fact, given the right circumstances it might even be inherently impossible for B to reach this conclusion. And similarly, B might be able to correctly reach absolute conclusions which A is unable to justify (even in regard to herself). Through the process of life the absolute claims which are and are not justifiable may even change for both A and B respectively. And no beliefs of any kind would be considered exempt from this possibility. Thus there exists Reality, an understanding of which is sometimes attainable, but there is no guarantee that any individual will be able to lay claim to a given part of it.
Is there any philosopher who would claim that this could be the case, and advances an argument in support of it? I hope I've explained well enough what I mean. Perhaps this could be called "incidental absolutism". Or is there a better phrase to describe a position like this?